Art. 222.Direct Contempt

Article 222 gives content to the “direct” side of Article 221’s contempt divide. The core test is presence and personal knowledge: a direct contempt is one the judge witnesses firsthand, in the judge’s immediate view. The article extends that core idea to one additional situation that behaves the same way procedurally — a contumacious failure to comply with a subpoena or summons, where proof of service already appears in the record, because the judge does not need to hear conflicting testimony to know the person was served and failed to show up.

The six numbered categories give the core definition teeth. They cover contumacious, insolent, or disorderly behavior toward the judge or an officer of the court; breach of the peace or violent disturbance in the courtroom; insulting or abusive language used in open court or in a filed pleading or brief as irrelevant criticism of an attorney or judge; violating a courtroom decorum rule; failing, without excuse, to comply with a proven subpoena, or refusing to take an oath or answer a non-incriminating question when the court orders it; and failing, without excuse, to attend court after being accepted as a juror or summoned for jury service, again where service is proven.

Because these categories play out where the judge can see them, or are proven by an undisputed record of service, Article 223 lets the court act on them without a full trial. That efficiency comes with a limit courts have recognized: a judge cannot use direct contempt to punish conduct that falls outside these enumerated categories, or as a shortcut around due process protections a person would otherwise be owed — a finding of contempt for supposed dishonesty during a hearing, for instance, does not fit within Article 222’s categories and cannot stand as direct contempt merely because it happened in the judge’s presence.