§ 9-9-43.Date of commencement of arbitral proceedings
Chapter 9. Arbitration · Article 1. General Provisions · Last amended 2012 · Last verified July 17, 2026
Full Text of § 9-9-43
Plain-English Summary
Knowing exactly when an arbitration “starts” sounds like a technicality until a deadline hinges on it. This section supplies the default: absent a different agreement, the clock starts running the day the respondent receives the claimant’s request to refer the dispute to arbitration.
That’s a deliberately plain, objective trigger. It doesn’t depend on when a tribunal is appointed, when the first hearing happens, or when either side files a formal statement of claim — all of which can take weeks or months to arrange. Receipt of the request is the one event both sides can point to and agree on.
Parties who want a different starting point — say, tying commencement to a notice requirement in their contract — remain free to agree to that instead. But without such an agreement, this default controls, and it can matter for anything measured from the start of the proceeding.
Frequently Asked Questions
When does an international arbitration officially commence under Georgia law?
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, it commences on the date the respondent receives the claimant’s request that the dispute be referred to arbitration.
Can the parties set a different commencement date by agreement?
Yes — this default rule applies only “unless otherwise agreed by the parties,” so a contract or later agreement specifying a different trigger controls instead.
Does commencement depend on when the tribunal is appointed?
No — the text ties commencement to the respondent’s receipt of the arbitration request, not to any later step such as appointing arbitrators.
Why does the commencement date matter?
It fixes the reference point for the proceeding as a whole, which can affect how other time-sensitive requirements in the arbitration are measured.
Does the claimant have to prove the respondent received the request?
The section ties commencement to the date of receipt by the respondent, so receipt is the operative fact the rule turns on.
Amendment History
Code 1981, § 9-9-43, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 961, § 1/SB 383.