42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Section 1985(3): conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
A claim in United States district courts · Last verified August 26, 2026
Section 1985(3) is the conspiracy companion to the main civil rights statute, and it does one thing that statute cannot: it reaches purely private conspiracies, with no state action at all.
That reach comes at a price the text does not disclose. Courts have confined the statute to conspiracies driven by class-based invidious animus, and then divided over which classes count. A second, entirely judge-made doctrine can defeat the claim before animus is ever reached — and whether it applies here depends on your circuit.
What the claim is
Two or more people conspired to deprive a person or class of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities, and did something in furtherance of it that caused you harm.
The recurring settings: racially motivated private violence or intimidation; conspiracies between private actors and officials to deprive someone of rights; interference with the right to travel between states; and — where the circuit permits it — conspiracies within an organisation to discriminate.
Where the right comes from
Express, from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. It reaches a conspiracy to deprive a person or class "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities."
But its reach is judicially confined, and that confinement is the whole doctrine.
In Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) the Court held the statute reaches private conspiracies, not merely those under colour of state law — the holding that gives the section its distinctive power. In the same breath it limited that power: the conspiracy must be driven by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."
That "perhaps" has been litigated for fifty years.
What a plaintiff has to prove
- A conspiracy — an agreement between two or more persons.
- For the purpose of depriving a person or class of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities.
- An act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- Resulting injury to person or property, or deprivation of a right.
Plus, from Griffin, class-based invidious animus.
Two doctrinal traps sit on top of the elements.
Which classes count. Race clearly qualifies. Beyond that the circuits diverge. Most require racial or comparable class-based animus and reject purely political conspiracies; a minority read Griffin more broadly. The Supreme Court declined to extend the statute to economic or commercial animus, and to political-association animus, and left open whether other non-racial classes qualify. In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic it held opposition to abortion is not animus against women as a class. Name your circuit's rule; there is no national answer.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Under it, agents of a single entity acting within the scope of their employment cannot conspire with each other — a corporation cannot conspire with itself. Applied here, it defeats most workplace and institutional claims outright, because the alleged conspirators are all employees of the same defendant.
Circuits split on whether it applies to civil rights conspiracies at all. Some apply it squarely; others recognise exceptions or decline to import a doctrine developed in antitrust into this setting. In Ziglar v. Abbasi the Supreme Court expressly declined to resolve it, granting qualified immunity instead because the law was unsettled — which left the split exactly where it was and guaranteed it would persist.
How long you have to file
No federal period. Courts borrow the forum state's personal-injury limitations period, exactly as they do for the main civil rights statute and for claims against federal officers.
Federal law governs accrual — the claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.
Section 1986 — the companion claim, and its one-year trap
A neighbouring section reaches a different defendant: not the conspirators, but someone who knew the conspiracy was coming, had the power to prevent it, and did nothing.
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured … for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.
Five elements: a § 1985 conspiracy the defendant knew was about to occur; power to prevent or help prevent it; neglect or refusal to act; the wrongful act was then committed; and reasonable diligence could have prevented it. Mere negligence in failing to act is enough — this is a claim about inaction, so no intent to harm is required.
It cannot stand alone. Section 1986 is entirely derivative: no viable § 1985 conspiracy underneath means no § 1986 claim. It is pleaded against supervisors, officials, and others who saw what was coming and let it happen.
And here is the trap, which is the whole reason to know this section exists. Section 1986 carries its own express one-year limitations period — "no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued."
That is dramatically shorter than the borrowed personal-injury period governing § 1985(3) itself, which commonly runs two or three years or more. A plaintiff who is comfortably timely on the conspiracy claim can be time-barred on the failure-to-prevent claim arising from the same facts.
Character: an express statutory limitations period — an affirmative defense, forfeitable if not raised, not a jurisdictional bar.
Remedies track the harm the defendant could have prevented, and the statute expressly provides for wrongful-death recovery. Attorney's fees are available on the same basis as for § 1985.
What has to happen before you file
Nothing. No exhaustion, no charge, no notice.
A prisoner suing over prison conditions still faces the prison litigation exhaustion requirement, which attaches to the case rather than to the statute.
Who can be sued — and who cannot
Two or more "persons" — private individuals, entities, or officials.
State action is required only for some claims, and that is the key structural point. A § 1985(3) claim resting on a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection deprivation needs state action, because that amendment itself does. But a claim resting on a right secured against private interference — the Thirteenth Amendment, or the right to travel between states — can reach a purely private conspiracy. That is what Griffin established, and it is why the statute matters at all.
Where officials are defendants, the ordinary civil rights immunities carry over: qualified immunity for individuals, absolute immunity for certain functions.
One structural bar. In Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny the Court held § 1985(3) cannot be used to remedy a violation of the federal employment discrimination statute. You cannot bootstrap a comprehensive statutory scheme, with its charge deadlines and damages caps, into this section to escape them. The reasoning extends to other statutes with their own remedial schemes.
Common defenses
No class-based invidious animus, or animus toward a class the circuit does not recognise.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, where it applies.
No agreement — parallel conduct by people with similar views is not a conspiracy.
No underlying deprivation of a protected right.
No state action, where the predicate right requires it.
Qualified immunity for officials.
The bootstrapping bar where the underlying wrong is covered by a statute with its own scheme.
Limitations.
What the claim pays
Compensatory and punitive damages, with no statutory cap.
Injunctive relief.
Attorney's fees. The civil rights fee statute does cover § 1985, which is worth noting because it does not cover claims against federal officers under Bivens. Same family of claims, opposite answer on fees.
Jury trial available.
What people get wrong
"Any two people conspiring to violate my rights are liable." No. Class-based invidious animus is required.
"Political conspiracies are covered." Most circuits say no, and the Supreme Court has declined to extend the statute to political-association animus.
"I can use it instead of the employment discrimination statute." No — that is the Novotny bar.
"Employees of one company can be a conspiracy." It depends entirely on whether your circuit applies the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine here.
"It requires state action like the main civil rights statute." Not always — that is the point of Griffin. It depends on which right the conspiracy targeted.
"It's just a longer way to plead a § 1983 claim." It reaches private actors the other statute cannot, and it requires an animus element the other does not.
Where it came from
Section 1985(3) was enacted in 1871 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act, in response to organised private violence against freedpeople in the Reconstruction South that state authorities would not stop. That history explains the design: Congress needed a federal remedy against private conspiracies, because the problem was that state actors were absent rather than present.
The provision then lay dormant for a century, on the assumption it could not constitutionally reach private conduct. Griffin v. Breckenridge revived it in 1971 by holding it could — and simultaneously narrowed it by reading in the class-based animus requirement that is not in the text.
Everything since has narrowed it further: Novotny (1979) blocking use against comprehensive statutory schemes, Carpenters v. Scott (1983) declining to extend animus beyond race, and Bray (1993) rejecting an abortion-based theory.
The two items most likely to move are the ones the Court has conspicuously not resolved: whether non-racial classes — particularly political affiliation — satisfy the animus requirement, and whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to civil rights conspiracies at all. Abbasi left the second open on purpose.
Common questions
Can I sue private individuals under section 1985(3)?
Yes — that is what distinguishes it from the main civil rights statute. Griffin v. Breckenridge held it reaches purely private conspiracies, provided the conspiracy targeted a right secured against private interference and was driven by class-based animus.
What kind of discriminatory motive is required?
Class-based invidious animus. Race clearly qualifies. Beyond race the circuits divide, and most reject purely political conspiracies. Check your circuit before pleading.
Can employees of the same company conspire with each other?
That depends on whether your circuit applies the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to civil rights claims. Some do, defeating most institutional claims; others decline. The Supreme Court expressly left the question open in Ziglar v. Abbasi.
Can I use section 1985(3) instead of filing an EEOC charge?
No. Novotny held you cannot use this section to remedy a violation of the employment discrimination statute and thereby escape its own procedures and limits.
Are attorney's fees available?
Yes. The civil rights fee statute covers § 1985 claims — unlike claims against federal officers, where fees are unavailable.
What is section 1986, and how long do I have to bring it?
Section 1986 reaches someone who knew a § 1985 conspiracy was coming, could have prevented it, and did not. It cannot stand without a viable § 1985 claim underneath. Critically, it carries its own one-year deadline — far shorter than the borrowed period governing § 1985(3) itself, so you can be timely on one claim and barred on the other.