Rule 75.Review of governmental action

Reporter’s Notes—2005 Amendment: Rule 75(a) is amended for consistency with simultaneous amendments promulgating the Vermont Rules for Environmental Court Proceedings and abrogating Rule 76. Note that Rule 75 might apply in a proper case within the original jurisdiction of the Environmental Court pursuant to V.R.E.C.P. 3.

Reporter’s Notes: This rule has no equivalent in the Federal Rules, but is based in part on Maine Rule 80B. It provides a simpler review procedure than that by appeal on the record under Rule 74 for state agency determinations that are not “contested cases” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 V.S.A. §§ 801-816, and for most reviewable determinations of local governmental bodies. (Pending legislation (1971-H. 326, § 193) would amend 24 V.S.A. § 4471 to bring appeals from local Zoning Boards of Adjustment under Rule 74 because of the formal nature of the proceedings before such boards.) Rule 75(a), like Rule 74, does not purport to say what determinations are reviewable, but provides a procedure applicable whenever county court review is provided by the particular statute establishing an agency or is available as a matter of general law by proceedings in the nature of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition. (Pending legislation (1971-H. 326, § 12) would amend 4 V.S.A. § 113 to make clear that the County Courts have such jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Court.) Thus, this rule will apply to such proceedings as appeals under 24 V.S.A. § 2255 from decisions of municipal legislative bodies on applications for junkyard licenses; petitions under 24 V.S.A. § 2810 to review decisions of the municipal officers in condemnation proceedings; petitions under 24 V.S.A. § 3406 et seq. for rehearing of selectmen’s decisions on takings for sewer purposes; appeals by municipal corporations under 24 V.S.A. § 3618 from orders of the Water Resources Board; and appeals under 24 V.S.A. § 3810 from decisions of fence viewers. In addition, the rule will apply on both the state and local levels to nonstatutory proceedings in the nature of certiorari to review judicial or quasi-judicial determinations as to which no other means of review is adequate and to nonstatutory proceedings in the nature of mandamus or prohibition to prevent an abuse of executive discretion or an excess of jurisdiction where no other remedy is available. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 81(b). Rule 75(b) makes the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings for review, unless a statute or this rule provides to the contrary. The subdivision specifies the contents of the complaint and eliminates any requirement for subsequent pleadings unless required by statute or ordered by the court. There is no formal provision in the rule for filing the record, because many of the agencies reviewed may make no record as such. Where there is a record, however, plaintiff may append it to the complaint or seek its production by the agency under Rule 34. The provisions for service and for free amendment are to make clear that a party who erroneously seeks review under this rule may amend his complaint to claim any form of ordinary civil relief, such as an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or damages, to which he may be entitled as a matter of substantive right. Rule 75(c) provides a 30-day time limit on review under the rule unless a statute gives a longer or shorter time. The time provided by the rule may be extended by the court in accordance with Rule 6(b), because it is not, and under the rulemaking power could not be, jurisdictional. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 82. The rule, consistent with Rule 74(b), provides for a stay of the decision being appealed only if ordered by the court. Rule 75(d) leaves to specific statute or prior practice the questions whether review in a given case is de novo and whether trial is to be to a jury. Rule 75(e) is intended to make clear that the decision of the county court is to be reviewed only by appeal as in ordinary civil actions and not by a new proceeding for extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court. Annotations Construction. Applicability. Construction with other law. Damages. Habeas corpus. Public Accommodations Act. Public employee retirement benefits. Public employee terminations. Record on appeal. Standard of review. Superior Court review. Supreme Court review. Tax abatements. Time limit. Construction. To the extent the rule governing review of governmental action alters the requirements of mandamus, it relaxes its formal requirements, for instance, by eliminating responsive pleading requirements at the discretion of the court, and by allowing amendment to permit a defective claim under the rule to be brought as an ordinary civil action. Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, 181 Vt. 309, 917 A.2d 508, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 315 (2006). By authorizing the Commissioner of Labor and Industry to set inspection and enforcement priorities and enabling defendant Vermont Department of Labor and Industry to exercise one or more of several enforcement options, the Legislature vested a great deal of discretion in defendant in performing the duties addressed in plaintiffs’ complaint. Thus, the duties plaintiffs sought to enforce in its claim that defendant failed to enforce the housing code were not ministerial, and mandamus could lie against defendant only under the “arbitrary abuse of power” exception. To determine whether plaintiffs’ claim fit within this exception, it was necessary to determine whether the facts they alleged and the reasonable inferences from those facts established that defendant’s conduct was so arbitrary that it amounted to a refusal to act or a failure to perform a legal duty, and that plaintiffs had no other adequate remedy. Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, 181 Vt. 309, 917 A.2d 508, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 315 (2006). Applicability. Plaintiff coalition, which challenged the necessity determination in the context of a proceeding to lay out a highway, lacked standing to appeal. Because it lacked any legal interest of record in any of the properties affected by defendant city’s order, it had no statutory right to appeal and therefore could not invoke Rule 74, governing appeals from decisions of government agencies; furthermore, Rule 75, governing review of governmental action, did not apply because Rule 74 offered a review mechanism. Friends of Pine St. v. City of Burlington, 2020 VT 43, 212 Vt. 342, 236 A.3d 1241, 2020 Vt. LEXIS 51 (2020). Under the statute governing denial of state disability retirement benefits and the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act, the proper avenue for an appeal from a state retirement board decision is an appeal directly to the Vermont Supreme Court. Accordingly, the superior court properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claimant’s action under the rule allowing review of governmental action. Moran v. Vt. State Ret. Bd., 2015 VT 119, 200 Vt. 354, 131 A.3d 212, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2015). Rule 75 review is adequate only if there is a sufficient pretermination hearing for a public employee. Because the Court could not resolve whether there was an adequate pretermination hearing, it could not judge whether Rule 75 review would be an adequate post-termination process. Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 2015 VT 5, 198 Vt. 277, 115 A.3d 423, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 5 (2015). Trial court properly dismissed a former city manager’s claim, alleging that he was improperly terminated from employment without a hearing by the city council, as judicial review was precluded by the explicit provisions of the city charter; the due process provision of the state constitution did not provide relief. Handverger v. City of Winooski, 2011 VT 130, 191 Vt. 556, 38 A.3d 1153, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 126 (2011) (mem.). When a town decided to reclassify a town road from a class 3 to a class 4 highway, review was by writ of certiorari under the rule providing for review of governmental action. Ketchum v. Town of Dorset, 2011 VT 49, 190 Vt. 507, 22 A.3d 500, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 49 (2011) (mem.). Rule allowing review of governmental action allows for an appellate remedy when a party is dissatisfied with state or municipal action but does not have a statutory right of direct appeal; there is no statutorily created right of direct appeal from a selectboard’s decision to withhold its approval for a helipad. Therefore, appeal under the rule was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy with regard to the selectboard’s decision. Coutu v. Town of Cavendish, 2011 VT 27, 189 Vt. 336, 19 A.3d 160, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 24 (2011). Should a defendant dispute the Department of Correction’s calculation of time served, he or she may file a grievance with the Commissioner, and thereafter seek review in the superior court under this rule. State v. Young, 2007 VT 30, 181 Vt. 603, 925 A.2d 1016, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 55 (2007) (mem.). Trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for breach of statutory and fiduciary duties against trustees of the State Teachers’ Retirement System. Ahern v. Mackey, 2007 VT 27, 181 Vt. 599, 925 A.2d 1011, 2007 Vt. LEXIS 56 (2007) (mem.). Although the writ of mandamus has been abolished, relief in the nature of mandamus remains available under the rule governing review of governmental action. Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, 181 Vt. 309, 917 A.2d 508, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 315 (2006). Because the alleged voluntary enforcement regime of defendant Vermont Department of Labor and Industry appeared inherently ineffective with respect to ensuring anything but the minimum level of housing code compliance necessary to avoid imminent hazards, leaving everything else to the discretion of the landlord, the system defendant implemented represented an arbitrary abuse of power that amounted to a failure to comply with its legal duties. As plaintiffs’ complaint was sufficient to allege that such a system was in place, it stated a claim in the nature of mandamus under the rule governing review of governmental action. Alger v. Department of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, 181 Vt. 309, 917 A.2d 508, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 315 (2006). Because the Legislature has not provided for review of wetland reclassification determinations, and the rule of the Water Resources Board (WRB) stating that review is available as provided in the rule of civil procedure governing review of governmental actions does not create or extend review under the civil rule, which does not provide for review of such determinations, and the Legislature’s silence in the face of the WRB rule is not binding acquiescence, and, even if it is, the Legislature would be acquiescing only to the statement that the rule governing review of governmental actions controls the scope of review of wetland reclassification determinations, the superior court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lake Bomoseen Association v. Vermont Water Resources Board, 2005 VT 79, 178 Vt. 375, 886 A.2d 355, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 160 (2005). Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 provided only for review of legal issues raised by selectboard’s issuance of permit for substandard septic system, since analogous relief pursuant to former writ of certiorari was confined to substantial questions of law affecting merits of case. Richards v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 726 A.2d 81, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1999). Landowner was entitled to appeal selectboard’s approval of his neighbor’s septic system under V.R.C.P. 75, where landowner’s appeal did not actually seek factual determination, but review of whether it was legally permissible under state sewage statute for selectboard to issue a permit for a septic system that did not comply with state minimum standards, which was a question of law. Richards v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 726 A.2d 81, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 13 (1999). The Attorney General’s certification decision approving a contract privatizing work previously done by state employees because it did not violate “the spirit and intent” of the state classification law was plainly discretionary in nature. Therefore, the superior court had jurisdiction to review this decision under only a very limited standard of review to determine whether there had been a clear and arbitrary abuse of authority. Vermont State Employees' Ass'n v. Criminal Justice Training Council, 167 Vt. 191, 704 A.2d 769, 1997 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1997). Relief under V.R.C.P. 75 is not available when legislature has established direct route of appeal. Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations Board, 162 Vt. 571, 649 A.2d 784, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1994). Trial court properly dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, party’s complaint brought under V.R.C.P. 75 because party could have appealed directly to supreme court under 3 V.S.A. § 1003 from Labor Relations Board’s ruling accepting labor union’s petition for election and certification. Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations Board, 162 Vt. 571, 649 A.2d 784, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1994). There is no statutory right to appeal a decision of the Board of Transportation, and therefore appeals must proceed under V.R.C.P. 75, the modern equivalent of extraordinary relief by mandamus or certiorari, a standard of review that is very narrow. In re Town of Bennington, 161 Vt. 573, 641 A.2d 1331, 1993 Vt. LEXIS 173 (1993) (mem.). Constitutional issue is not required for review in the nature of certiorari to be available. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 620 A.2d 1266, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1992). Superior court erred in dismissing complaint challenging firing of police chief on ground that certiorari review was unavailable because no substantial constitutional issue was raised. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 620 A.2d 1266, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1992). This rule does not apply to appeals from a district court, since a district court is not “an agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof.” Pfeil v. Rutland District Court, 147 Vt. 305, 515 A.2d 1052, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 419 (1986) (overruling Miner v. District Court, 136 Vt. 426, 392 A.2d 390 (1978)). This rule applies only to appeals from a state agency to the superior court, not to the supreme court. In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 138 Vt. 213, 414 A.2d 1159, 1980 Vt. LEXIS 1207 (1980). Construction with other law. Defendant school district failed in its argument that the time limitations of the Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure on review of administrative actions applied to limit plaintiff principal’s right to appeal the board’s decision to place him on administrative leave. The pleadings contained no statute-of-limitations argument in any form, whether under the statute on dismissal or the civil rule. Thus, plaintiff’s action could not be dismissed as untimely filed. Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. Dist., 2006 VT 83, 181 Vt. 198, 917 A.2d 923, 2006 Vt. LEXIS 158 (2006). In In re Carrier, Supreme Court did not grant a permissive party standing to bring an appeal under V.R.C.P. 75 in superior court; court simply reiterated the absolute precondition for its consideration of an action under V.R.A.P. 21 that a complaint state why there is no adequate remedy by way of a proceeding in superior court. In re Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Inc., 164 Vt. 26, 663 A.2d 940, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1995). Petitioner, who was allowed to participate as permissive party in administrative proceedings regarding land use permit, could not challenge the merits of an Environmental Board decision by relying on the extraordinary relief provided by V.R.C.P. 75 where he was prohibited from doing so pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c). In re Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Inc., 164 Vt. 26, 663 A.2d 940, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1995). It would not make sense to afford aggrieved parties right to appeal from Labor Relations Board (LRB) orders in all proceedings under State Employees Labor Relations Act (SELRA) and Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), but to force parties to use indirect appeal route under V.R.C.P. 75 to appeal from LRB orders in identical proceedings under State Labor Relations Act. Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations Board, 162 Vt. 571, 649 A.2d 784, 1994 Vt. LEXIS 108 (1994). Where legislation does not affirmatively indicate that review is “available by law,” supreme court review is permitted by petition for extraordinary relief. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 620 A.2d 1266, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1992). For purposes of this rule, review is not “available by law” when legislature has declared that an action of a tribunal shall be final. Hunt v. Village of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 620 A.2d 1266, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 204 (1992). This rule did not give parents the right to appellate review of state board’s affirmance of local school board’s decision not to pay their child’s tuition at a school other than the one designated by the local board as the public high school of their school district, since availability of and entitlement to review were precluded by section 827 of Title 16, governing designation of such schools, which provided that decision of the state board would be final. Mason v. Thetford School Board, 142 Vt. 495, 457 A.2d 647, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 418 (1983). Where a petition for extraordinary relief was brought by a teacher against a school board for failure to renew her teaching contract, the teacher’s case was properly viewed as a petition in the nature of a writ of certiorari to the superior court for review under this rule, since the supreme court has held that review of school board decisions under section 1752 of Title 16, governing grounds and procedures for suspension and dismissal, may be obtained by a writ of certiorari as provided by section 2 of Title 4, setting forth the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Burroughs v. West Windsor Board of School Directors, 141 Vt. 234, 446 A.2d 377, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 505 (1982). This rule does not confer superior court jurisdiction over decisions of board established under section 628 of Title 21 with respect to claims by state employees for benefits since availability of and entitlement to review is precluded by that section, which provides that decisions of the board shall be final. Howard v. Office of Secretary of State, 140 Vt. 139, 435 A.2d 962, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 572 (1981). Abolition of the extraordinary writs by V.R.C.P. 81 is consistent with the provisions of this rule and V.R.C.P. 75, which provide exclusive remedies for review of governmental action. Chapin Hill Estates, Inc. v. Town of Stowe, 131 Vt. 10, 298 A.2d 815, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 222 (1972). Damages. Plaintiff's appeal, in which it argued that it should have been awarded a school contract, was moot, as the Court took judicial notice of the completion of the demolition undergirding the bidding process at issue in that the school district had issued a press release indicating that demolition was complete and posted a video on its website showing not only the completion of the demolition and soil remediation, but the progress of new construction; because plaintiff could not recover money damages under Rule 75 and injunctive relief would be strictly illusory, the Court could no longer grant effective relief. Am. Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District, 2024 VT 59, 220 Vt. 96, 327 A.3d 837, 2024 Vt. LEXIS 63 (2024). Habeas corpus. Habeas corpus review is unavailable where an inmate intentionally avoids administrative review under this rule, either entirely or relative to an individual issue, to gain habeas corpus review. Shuttle v. Patrissi, 158 Vt. 127, 605 A.2d 845, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1992). Superior court properly exercised habeas corpus jurisdiction despite inmate defendant’s failure to properly pursue administrative review under this rule, where court looked at substance of appeal, not label, in changing action into habeas petition, record showed no strategy to deliberately delay filing under rule to gain advantage, defendant did not benefit from failure to properly invoke rule, and application of habeas statute was appropriate considering minimal due process safeguards found in prison disciplinary system. Shuttle v. Patrissi, 158 Vt. 127, 605 A.2d 845, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1992). Where review under this rule is unavailable and there is no evidence of a deliberate relinquishment of rights under this rule, habeas corpus review provides an alternative means of protecting liberty interests of an inmate whose incarceration is prolonged as a result of prison disciplinary measures. Shuttle v. Patrissi, 158 Vt. 127, 605 A.2d 845, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 22 (1992). Public Accommodations Act. Rule 75, via either mandamus or prohibition, did not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court to review the Vermont Human Rights Commission's determination to investigate a complaint of discrimination based on peer-to- peer harassment in a school under the Vermont Public Accommodations Act, as the decision whether a prima facie case existed was within the Commission's discretion and thus could not be reviewed through mandamus, and the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under prohibition to review the Commission's determination because the Commission was not a quasi-judicial tribunal. Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vt. Human Rights Comm'n, 2023 VT 63, 218 Vt. 496, 311 A.3d 139, 2023 Vt. LEXIS 62 (2023). Public employee retirement benefits. Vermont public employees have long enjoyed the right to review of decisions affecting their retirement benefits. Therefore, the trial court properly found jurisdiction to review a city retirement board’s decision to terminate a former firefighter’s disability retirement benefits. Preston v. Burlington City Ret. Sys., 2013 VT 56, 194 Vt. 147, 76 A.3d 615, 2013 Vt. LEXIS 50 (2013). Public employee terminations. Trial court properly ordered a city to give an employee a new post-termination grievance hearing that fully satisfied her due process rights, because in the context of a tenured municipal employee protected by a “justifiable cause” provision, post-termination administrative proceedings are required to satisfy due process where pre-termination proceedings do not include a full hearing but instead meet only the minimum pre-termination requirements of Loudermill. In the absence of post-termination administrative proceedings, neither an appeal under the rule applying to review of governmental action nor a breach-of-contract action filed in the trial court provides sufficient post- termination process to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier, 2015 VT 83, 199 Vt. 488, 125 A.3d 882, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 65 (2015). Record on appeal. In reviewing a town’s reclassification of a road by writ of certiorari, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request to supplement the record on appeal. The statute was silent on the method of review, and the decision was made following a quasi-judicial procedure by the town selectboard in which plaintiffs freely participated. Ketchum v. Town of Dorset, 2011 VT 49, 190 Vt. 507, 22 A.3d 500, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 49 (2011) (mem.). Standard of review. Where the reviewing court is faced with a question of law and where the record is sufficient and complete, on-the- record review is appropriate; the reviewing court has discretion, however, to engage in a de novo proceeding and take additional evidence. Further, where an administrative agency makes its decision following a quasi-judicial procedure in which the plaintiff freely participates, de novo review may be inappropriate. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 2011 VT 122, 191 Vt. 76, 38 A.3d 1133, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 123 (2011). Taxpayer who was denied abatement conceded that there were no disputed issues of fact and no additional evidence that he wanted to enter into the record. Therefore, the trial court did not err in conducting an on-the-record review following the taxpayer’s complaint brought pursuant to the rule providing for review of governmental action. Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield, 2011 VT 122, 191 Vt. 76, 38 A.3d 1133, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 123 (2011). Superior Court review. Although the trial court’s determination that an inmate could not seek review of his designation as a “high risk” sex offender was erroneous, exactly when the inmate was given notice of his designation remained a question of fact and was improper for disposal on the pleadings. Thus, remand was required to determine whether the inmate received notice of the designation decision such that the limitations period began to run. Rheaume v. Pallito, 2011 VT 72, 190 Vt. 245, 30 A.3d 1263, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 67 (2011). While an inmate may have review of his “high risk” sex offender designation under the rule regarding review of governmental action, the particular programming requirements promulgated after that designation becomes final are a matter of Department of Corrections discretion and as such are not reviewable under the rule. Rheaume v. Pallito, 2011 VT 72, 190 Vt. 245, 30 A.3d 1263, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 67 (2011). There are several ways that a trial court can determine whether a defendant has received proper sentence credit for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense for which sentence was imposed. First, the sentencing court can decide that calculation of the time served involves a legal question that is best resolved by the court, and it can specify the extent of the credit, if any; second, the trial court can leave the sentence calculation to the Commissioner of Corrections, under which the normal remedy to challenge the Commissioner’s conclusion would be an appeal to the civil division of the superior court; and third, the sentence can be reviewed to determine whether it is illegal because it fails to give defendant credit for days spent in custody in connection with the crime(s) for which defendant is sentenced. State v. Sommer, 2011 VT 59, 190 Vt. 236, 27 A.3d 1059, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 53 (2011). Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider petition for extraordinary relief from administrative proceeding, it should have dismissed the petition on those grounds; its reliance on other grounds did not change the result or require a remand. In re Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Inc., 164 Vt. 26, 663 A.2d 940, 1995 Vt. LEXIS 63 (1995). Superior court review of University of Vermont’s denial of student’s application for resident tuition status would be limited to a review of university’s quasi-judicial action and confined to addressing substantial questions of law affecting the merits of the case. Molesworth v. University of Vermont, 147 Vt. 4, 508 A.2d 722, 1986 Vt. LEXIS 341 (1986). In proceedings to determine whether proof of financial responsibility was required following automobile accident, where section 802 of Title 23, controlling motorist’s right to a hearing and review, provided that no findings made by court on review were to be used in any way in any litigation arising out of the accident, findings implied a de novo proceeding, and it was error to deny motorist’s request for a de novo review in the superior court. Richardson v. Conway, 136 Vt. 575, 396 A.2d 143, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 673 (1978). Under this rule, the superior court had jurisdiction in the nature of an appellate court only; if the superior court found there were factual issues requiring a hearing, it was required to remand the case. Grant v. Grant, 136 Vt. 9, 383 A.2d 627, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 678 (1978). Supreme Court review. Complaint in superior court filed pursuant to the rule providing for review of governmental action does not afford sufficient notice of an appellate proceeding in the Vermont Supreme Court, and therefore cannot initiate appellate proceedings there. Moran v. Vt. State Ret. Bd., 2015 VT 119, 200 Vt. 354, 131 A.3d 212, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2015). Complaint under the rule providing for review of governmental action that the claimant filed in the superior court was defective as a notice of appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court because it failed to name the court to which the appeal was taken. Moreover, by purporting to transfer the case from the state retirement board to the superior court, the complaint failed to invoke the supreme court’s jurisdiction. Moran v. Vt. State Ret. Bd., 2015 VT 119, 200 Vt. 354, 131 A.3d 212, 2015 Vt. LEXIS 98 (2015). The supreme court does not conduct a searching review of the decisions of a specialized board. Instead, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting quasi-judicial decisions under this rule, the court determines only whether there is any competent evidence to justify the adjudication. Rouleau v. Williamstown School Board, 2005 VT 131, 179 Vt. 576, 892 A.2d 223, 2005 Vt. LEXIS 315 (2005) (mem.). Where this rule contemplated superior court review of administrative proceeding, with subsequent appeal to supreme court, there was no direct appellate jurisdiction of administrative decision in supreme court. Fitzpatrick v. Vermont State Retirement System, 136 Vt. 510, 394 A.2d 1138, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 657 (1978). Tax abatements. Taxpayer who sought to appeal a tax abatement denial was entitled to review in the civil division. Murray v. City of Burlington, 2012 VT 11, 191 Vt. 597, 44 A.3d 162, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 12 (2012) (mem.). Time limit. If a letter was not a final decision on plaintiff’s request for a helipad, then there could be no doubt that the town had failed to act, which would trigger the six-month limitations period of the rule allowing review of governmental action. Thus, even taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the limitations period had run—either under the thirty-day period or the six-month period—and therefore the town’s action was no longer appealable under the rule. Coutu v. Town of Cavendish, 2011 VT 27, 189 Vt. 336, 19 A.3d 160, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 24 (2011). Portion of the complaint seeking review of the Vermont Transportation Board Secretary’s refusal to consider plaintiff’s petition was filed well within either the thirty-day or the six-month limitations period of the rule allowing review of governmental action and should have been considered by the trial court. Coutu v. Town of Cavendish, 2011 VT 27, 189 Vt. 336, 19 A.3d 160, 2011 Vt. LEXIS 24 (2011). The thirty-day filing requirement of this rule is not jurisdictional. Fyles v. Schmidt, 141 Vt. 419, 449 A.2d 962, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 549 (1982).