Rule 4.2.Trustee process

Reporter’s Notes—2018 Amendment: Rule 4.2(j)(3) is amended to extend its 3-day time period to 5 days consistent with the simultaneous “day is a day” amendments to V.R.C.P. 6.

Reporter’s Notes—2016 Amendment: V.R.C.P. 4.2(a) is amended for conformity with the simultaneous abrogation of former V.R.F.P. 4 and promulgation of restyled and reorganized V.R.F.P. 4.0-4.3. See Reporter’s Notes to those rules.

Reporter’s Notes—2008 Amendment: Rule 4.2(j)(3) is amended to eliminate language that could be read as requiring the court to serve a trustee summons against earnings on the trustee and judgment debtor. Trustee process against earnings on motion by the judgment creditor is authorized after judgment by 12 V.S.A. § 3168(b), which provides that when the creditor files the motion, “the court shall give notice thereof to the trustee and to the judgment debtor as provided by Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and shall hold a hearing on the motion.” The amendment makes clear that the statutory requirement is satisfied by the provision of the rule for notification by the clerk to the parties of the date and time of hearing. Service of the summons and related papers, and the costs of service, are the responsibility of the creditor.

Reporter’s Notes—2002 Amendment: Rule 4.2(a) is amended to substitute a reference to V.R.F.P. 4(o) for former V.R.C.P. 80(o), which it superseded. Since Rule 4.2(a) applies in Family Court proceedings by virtue of V.R.F.P. 4(b)(2)(C)(i) and 4(o)(1), it is necessary to retain the exception for wage withholding proceedings in the rule.

Reporter’s Notes—1995 Amendment: A sentence is added to Rule 4.2(j)(3) to eliminate an anomaly. Under Rule 4.2(k), a post-judgment trustee summons against credits other than earnings is to be cancelled if the clerk learns from the officer holding the execution or from the creditor that the judgment has been satisfied. There is no comparable provision in Rule 4.2(j) providing for post-judgment trustee process against earnings. Thus, the employer-trustee and the employee- judgment debtor may be put to the expense and potential embarrassment of attending a disclosure hearing even though the creditor’s claims have been satisfied. Because Rule 4.2(j)(3) does not contemplate issuance of a writ of execution, the amendment provides a procedure that depends solely on the creditor’s initiative in notifying the clerk. Once notification is received, the clerk is to advise the Presiding Judge to cancel the summons. The clerk is then to cancel the hearing and promptly notify the trustee and debtor. The amended rule does not specify sanctions for a creditor who fails to give timely notification to the clerk. Of course, if a creditor files a motion for trustee process or delivers the summons for service after satisfaction of the judgment, sanctions under Rule 11 may be appropriate. Where a creditor knowingly fails to give notification of satisfaction occurring between the time of service and the date of the hearing, the court may assess costs as provided in Rule 54(d), (f), against the creditor in favor of the trustee and debtor. Cf. Rule 4.2(g); Peterson v. Chichester, 157 Vt. 548, 600 A.2d 1326 (1991).

Reporter’s Notes—1988 Amendment: Rule 4.2(b) is amended to delete the exemption formerly provided by these rules for the contents of demand bank accounts to the extent they do not exceed one hundred dollars. The 1987 amendments to this rule and the addition of Form 34 render unnecessary this exemption. See Reporter’s Notes—1987 Amendment, Form 2A, and Reporter’s Notes, Form 34. Rule 4.2(j) pertaining to trustee process against earnings is amended in two respects. Subdivision (3) is amended to add “a disclosure form and a list of exemptions” to the list of documents which must be served on the trustee and debtor. The disclosure form is new Form 37 in the Appendix of Forms. The list of exemptions is Form 34, added in 1987 to the Appendix of Forms. The purposes of this amendment are to ease the burden on trustees and to ensure that statutory exemptions are fully protected. See Reporter’s Notes—1987 Amendment, Rule 4.1, and the Reporter’s Note to Form 34. Rule 4.2(j)(5) also is amended. The definition of earnings is modified to state that “earnings” do not include payments from sources which by law are exempt from attachment. The purpose is to fully protect statutory exemptions, not to create any new exemptions. As of the date of promulgation of this rule change, the major existing statutory exemptions are listed in Form 34. Note that this amendment has two effects. First, the listed payment, if indeed exempt, cannot be attached. Second, and perhaps less obvious, the listed payment cannot be used to determine “disposable earnings” under Rule 4.2(j)(5)(ii) and the monetary limitations under Rule 4.2(j)(2). The definition of “earnings” in this rule is incorporated by reference into Rule 80(o), on support wage assignment. See Rules 4.2(a) and 80(o)(1) and the Reporter’s Notes to the 1985 amendments to Rules 4.2(a) and 80(o). The exemptions, however, do not remain the same. Most federal statutory exemptions contain exceptions so that in computing and attaching wages or other earnings for child support, and sometimes alimony, the exemptions cease to apply. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 659–662 (generally making available for attachment for child support and alimony all federally paid earnings) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (private pensions subject to attachment for child support, alimony and marital property rights). But see 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (veteran’s benefits subject to attachment only where “specifically authorized by law”); 45 U.S.C. § 231m (pensions of railway workers generally not subject to attachment); 42 U.S.C. § 407 (Social Security payments not subject to attachment unless exception to this rule expressly mentions § 407). Even the basic computation of the amount of earnings which may be attached differs for support orders. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b); 42 U.S.C. § 466(b); 15 V.S.A. §§ 782(a)(5)(B), 789(a). Whether or not Vermont statutory exemptions continue in effect remains to be seen. Compare 15 V.S.A. § 789(a), setting forth wage assignment exemptions, with the state exemptions listed in Form 34, paragraphs 3, 6, 7 and 8.

Reporter’s Notes—1987 Amendment: Rule 4.2 is amended to simplify procedures for trustee process. The prior rule relied upon statutes, 12 V.S.A. Chapter 121, for establishment of the procedures to be followed by parties and the trustee. The statutory procedures were complicated and confusing. The new procedure is set forth explicitly in the rule, and relies upon standardized official forms to lessen the burdens on all participants. Subdivision (d) of the rule as amended requires the plaintiff’s attorney to serve a disclosure form on the trustee along with the summons. Forms 2A and 21A should be utilized. See V.R.C.P. 84. A list of exemptions also must be served. See Form 34. Only if the answers submitted on the disclosure form do not provide adequate information may the plaintiff propound interrogatories to the trustee as if the trustee were a party under V.R.C.P. 33. Even then the rule requires the interrogatories to be concise. Subdivision (f) is amended to delete the incorporation by reference of the procedures set forth in Title 12 for disclosure by the trustee. Subdivision (g) also eliminates deference to statutory procedures for adjudication and establishes instead a simplified hearing process. If a party wishes to contest or supplement the information produced on the disclosure form or in answer to interrogatories, that party must request a hearing. If a party wishes to interrogate the trustee or any other witness before the court, that party is responsible for securing attendance of the witness. The court will base its decision on the answers to the disclosure form, the interrogatories, and all of the other evidence submitted. The rule does continue to incorporate statutory procedure for imposition of costs. See 12 V.S.A. §§ 3083-3088, 3171. Subdivision (k) is amended to make clear that in post-judgment trustee process, as in prejudgment trustee process, a disclosure form and a list of exemptions must be served on the trustee and the debtor. By statute, 12 V.S.A. § 2732, post-judgment trustee process is governed by the same rules as trustee process utilized in connection with the commencement of an action.

Reporter’s Notes—1985 Amendment: Rule 4.2(a) is amended to reference Rule 80(o) as an additional authorized procedure for trustee process of wages. Rule 80(o) provides procedure for support wage assignment, a new method of trustee process of wages for payment of support obligations. See Reporter’s Notes—1985 Amendment to Rule 80.

Reporter’s Notes—1984 Amendment: Rule 4.2(b)(1) is amended to correct a wording error made in the 1982 amendment. Rule 4.2(k) is amended to allow post-judgment trustee process to be issued for the amount that can be collected on levy of execution rather than for the amount of the judgment. The change in wording allows the trustee process to cover post-judgment interest as provided in Rule 69. See Reporter’s Notes—1981 Amendment to Rule 69. The change is consistent with the use of post-judgment trustee process in aid of execution. See 12 V.S.A. § 2732. By virtue of the incorporation of this rule into D.C.C.R. 4.2, the amendments also apply in District Court.

Reporter’s Notes—1983 Amendment: Rule 4.2(i) is amended to clarify and simplify the use of trustee process after entry of judgment. The amendment to this rule is similar in purpose and effect to the amendment made to Rule 4.1(g). See Reporter’s Notes—1983 Amendment to Rule 4.1. Rule 4.2(k) is added to clarify the procedure for use of trustee process after final judgment. Such a use of trustee process is authorized by 12 V.S.A. § 2732 with the limitation that the clerk may issue the summons to trustee only to the officer “holding the execution” and the summons may be served only on a trustee who holds goods, effects or credits, other than earnings, of the debtor which have not formerly been attached on trustee process in connection with the action. After being served with the summons, the trustee must proceed in the same manner as he would if the trustee process has been issued at the commencement of the action. Thus, the trustee must make a disclosure under Rule 4.2(f), and there must be an adjudication under Rule 4.2(g). Rule 4.2(k) clarifies the procedure by specifying that the judgment serves as an order of approval under subdivision (b) so that the creditor needs no further authorization from the judge to obtain the trustee process. The procedural protections mandated by Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and its progeny are no longer required since the debtor has been heard and the claim has been reduced to judgment. See generally Dunham, Post-Judgment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing, 21 S.D.L. Rev. 78, 92-99 (1976). Rule 4.2(k) does embody certain debtor protections to avoid misuse and resulting constitutional problems. The sum of the “face amounts” of the summons cannot exceed the amount of the judgment. See Reporter’s Notes—1982 Amendment (similar limit in 4.2(b)(1)). If the clerk finds the judgment has been satisfied in whole or in part, the clerk must bring it to the attention of the Presiding Judge who must cancel any outstanding summons or reduce the amount. The clerk will notify the trustee of the action. A contemporaneous amendment has been made in Form 2A so that the trustee can determine that he has been served with post-judgment trustee process and no order of approval is required. By virtue of the incorporation of this rule into D.C.C.R. 4.2, the amendments also apply in District Court.

Reporter’s Notes—1982 Amendment: Rule 4.2(b)(1) and (i) are amended to clarify the rule to offer more flexibility to plaintiffs in the use of trustee process. The amendment applies in district court by virtue of D.C.C.R. 4.2. The addition to subdivision (b)(1) clearly authorizes two practices: (a) the approval of trustee process against any trustee; (b) the approval of multiple trustee summonses within the overall amount approved. The rule was amended in 1973 to add the order of approval requirement to comply with the Supreme Court decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Although the rule did not specify the exact content of the order of approval, the model in Form 2A was often used. The form included a part where the court specified the trustee to be summoned. Some trial judges interpreted the form as showing that the rule intended that the trustee be specified and refused to issue an order of approval without such specification. Others issued orders of approval without specifying the trustee, leaving that to the plaintiff’s discretion. A number of factors bear on whether to specify the trustee in the order of approval. The plaintiff may fear that the defendant will move the goods, effects or credits if he has notice that the plaintiff will summon a particular trustee. On the other hand, the defendant may want to show certain property is not his or is exempt under 12 V.S.A. § 2740 or is in the hands of a trustee exempt under 12 V.S.A. § 3020. These considerations should be weighed in the individual case and make inappropriate a rule always prohibiting or requiring specification of the trustee in the order of approval. There is another important reason for this clarification. The danger that the defendant will “withdraw . . . the goods and credits from the hands and possession of the trustee” will often justify issuance of an ex parte order of approval under subdivision (b)(3). It is highly desirable that the plaintiff have a way to obtain trustee process through the hearing procedure rather than encourage resort to ex parte approval. The second clarification is done for similar reasons. The plaintiff may have to summon more than one trustee to attach the amount necessary to secure the claim. Multiple summonses are not prohibited by the rule, but the wording of Form 2A suggests they were not intended. The trial judges are divided on whether more than one summons can issue. There is no reason to refuse multiple summons as long as they can be administered easily, and important debtor protections are not eliminated. The only difficulty is in relating the multiple summons to the maximum amount specified in the order of approval. The maximum amount is specified to ensure that the goods, effects or credits attached do not exceed in value that which can be justified by plaintiff’s claim. In order to ensure ease of administration and debtor protection the addition to subdivision (b) authorizes multiple summonses as long as the sum of their “face values”—that is, the amounts for which the goods, effects or credits of the defendant are to be attached on trustee process—do not exceed the amount specified in the order of approval. Unless otherwise ordered, the clerk can issue any number of summonses as long as the sum of the “face values” stays within the amount approved. In some cases, the disclosures pursuant to Rule 4.2(f) will indicate the plaintiff has actually attached less property than is authorized and intended. The clerk may not use these disclosures to issue further summonses. However, the amendment does authorize the clerk to issue a substitute summons with respect to any trustee to change the amount attached. Once the substitute has been served, the sum of the “face values” has then changed and may allow the clerk to issue further summonses within the authorized amount. Because of the authorization for multiple and substitute summonses in (b)(1), subdivision (i) is clarified to specify that it applies only when the subsequent or additional process that is sought would mean that the sum of the “face values” would exceed the maximum specified in the order of approval. Rule 4.2(j) is amended to change the definition of earnings consistent with the recent amendment to the relevant statute. See 12 V.S.A. § 3169(b)(2), as amended by Act No. 58 of 1981. The language of the rule is identical to that of the statute. The amendment applies in district court by virtue of D.C.C.R. 4.2.

Reporter’s Notes—1981 Amendment: Rule 4.2(a) is amended to correct the reference to subdivision (j) to be clear it applies only when the trustee is alleged to hold an amount due to the defendant “as earnings.” These two words were erroneously omitted in the 1975 amendment to the rule. Rule 4.2(j) is amended to conform to the provisions of 12 V.S.A. §§ 3167-3172, enacted by Act No. 67 of 1979, effective July 1, 1979, with respect to judgments rendered subsequent to May 8, 1979. That act changed the procedure for trustee process of earnings in a number of respects and provided that inconsistent provisions of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure shall be superseded as of the effective date of the act. 12 V.S.A. § 2681. This amendment will also govern procedure in the District Court by virtue of the incorporation of Rule 4.2 into the comparable District Court Civil Rule. The purpose of the legislative enactment was to give the courts more flexibility in the use of trustee process of earnings, to expand some of the protections for the defendant and to modify procedures consistent with this substantive change. The specific changes are outlined below. Rule 4.2(j)(1) adds three requirements that must be satisfied before trustee process of earnings is available. The first is that execution may issue on the judgment. This language is intended to implement the statutory requirement that the judgment be “final.” The term “final” is not used, however, because it often refers to a judgment that disposes of all the controversy and adjudicates all the rights of the parties. See, e.g., Beam v. Fish, 105 Vt. 96, 163 A. 591 (1933). In this context, the term “final” means the judgment is no longer appealable and, thus, is ripe for execution. To make this meaning clear, the rule uses the availability of execution as the test. See Rule 62. The second requirement is that debtor “has neglected or refused to pay or make reasonable arrangements to pay the judgment.” These words are used in the statute. See 12 V.S.A. § 3168(a). Whether they add an additional element above nonpayment will have to await judicial interpretation. The third requirement is that the debtor has not, within two months prior to the hearing on trustee process, been a recipient of assistance from the Vermont Department of Social Welfare. Assistance is defined in 33 V.S.A. § 2502(a) to include aid under the general assistance, aid to needy families with children, supplemental security income, and medical assistance programs. Rule 4.2(j)(2) expands the exemptions available to the debtor in accordance with 12 V.S.A. § 3170(b). The United States Code reference is to definitions contained in the truth in lending provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Unlike prior practice, the notification to the proposed trustee as provided in Rule 4.2(j)(3) must occur prior to the authorization for trustee process. Thus, the summons must notify the proposed trustee of both his ability to appear and contest issuance of an order granting the motion and his obligation to make a disclosure under oath. Official Form 2B is also being amended to reflect this change in the scope of the notice to the proposed trustee. The wording of the form is also expanded to allow for use of disclosure questionnaire that would enable the trustee to discharge the disclosure obligation without appearance at the hearing and without the necessity of retaining legal representation. Use of a questionnaire is proper supplemental procedure that is not inconsistent with this rule. See Rule 81(d). Because a debtor against whom a default judgment has been entered is not normally entitled to notice of further proceedings, see Rule 5(a), notice to a defendant in default is specifically provided. Rule 4.2(j)(4) establishes the procedure at the hearing on the motion. The trustee has the option of appearing or making a disclosure in writing prior to the hearing. If he does neither, he may be adjudged a trustee by default. See 12 V.S.A. § 3062. If a person is adjudged a trustee by default, a judgment for the amount of recovery of the plaintiff is entered against the trustee. 12 V.S.A. § 3063. In accordance with statute, the order of the court “may provide for repetitive withholding from earnings.” 12 V.S.A. § 3170(c). Unlike the former rule, the statute sets no specific time limit after which trustee process cannot be used. Accordingly, the rule is silent on this issue.

Reporter’s Notes—1979 Amendment: Rule 4.2 is amended for consistency with the simultaneous amendments to Rule 4.1. See Reporter’s Notes to that amendment.

Reporter’s Notes—1977 Amendment: Rule 4.2(j)(2) is amended to reflect recent changes in the federal minimum wage. The amendment will be effective in the District Court by virtue of D.C.C.R. 4.2. The amendment to subparagraphs (i) and (ii), following the formula laid down in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1673, provides that if weekly earnings are $92 or less, only the excess over $69 may be attached; if weekly earnings exceed $92 only 25% may be attached. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.2(j)(2) as originally promulgated. New subparagraph (iv) states the federal formula in general terms as a backup for future changes in the minimum wage. Such changes will not make the rule technically invalid pending further amendment of subparagraphs (i) and (ii).

Reporter’s Notes—1975 Amendment: The background and purpose of these amendments is explained in the Reporter’s Notes to the 1975 amendments of Rule 4.1. Rule 4.2(a) is amended to eliminate the limitation of trustee process (other than against earnings) to the commencement of the action. Rule 4.2(a) is amended for consistency with Rule 4.2(i). If trustee process is issued at the outset under an ex parte order, it must be served upon the trustee within 30 days after the complaint is filed and a copy of the trustee summons and return must be served upon the defendant with the summons and complaint in accordance with Rule 4. If trustee process is approved after an adversary hearing at the outset, or is approved under Rule 4.2(i) after either type of hearing, it must be served upon the trustee within 30 days of the order of approval. Service upon the defendant is to be made promptly under Rule 5. Rule 4.2(i), like amended Rule 4.1(g), provides for either “subsequent” or “additional” trustee process. See Reporter’s Notes to 1975 Amendment of Rule 4.1(g). The requirements of Rule 4.2(b)(2) or (3) for hearing and order of approval apply to both forms of process. Where additional trustee process is sought, there is the further requirement of a showing of cause. The party seeking the trustee process must affirmatively demonstrate why previously approved trustee process has not provided adequate security.

Reporter’s Notes—1973 Amendment: The amendments to this rule are similar in effect to and are adopted for the same purpose as those made to Rule 4.1. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1. Accordingly, wherever possible, amended Rule 4.2 incorporates or adopts provisions of Rule 4.1. The Reporter’s Notes to that rule explain the purpose and operation of provisions of Rule 4.2 not discussed in this note. Under amended Rule 4.2(b), notice and hearing are required for the issuance of any trustee process, with limited exceptions. If those exceptions do not apply, the procedure for such notice and hearing is identical to that provided for issuance of an order of approval for a nonpossessory attachment under Rule 4.1(b)(3). The exceptions, contained in Rule 4.2(b)(3), are similar to those for attachment with variations appropriate to trustee process. It should be noted that, despite the obvious danger that any defendant notified of trustee process may take steps such as the withdrawal of a bank account, plaintiff must show by “specific facts” that the danger is actually present in the particular case. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1(b)(4), (i). If the court finds that one of the exceptions is present, it may order trustee process to issue ex parte. An exemption of $100 in bank deposits held by any one trustee is allowed, to provide living expenses for a defendant pending hearing on dissolution or modification of an ex parte trustee attachment. In other respects, the procedure for both ex parte and adversary orders of approval is identical with that provided by Rule 4.1(b) for writs of attachment. As pointed out in the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1, a motion for order of approval of trustee process may be joined with one for attachment, and a combined order for both may be issued by the court. Amended Rule 4.2(d) provides different methods of service, according to whether the attachment is ordered upon notice and hearing or ex parte. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1(d). Amended Rule 4.2(e) incorporates the dissolution, modification, and discharge procedures of Rule 4.1(e). Like that provision, it is derived from Rule 65(a) and provides for an expeditious determination of defendant’s motion to dissolve or modify an ex parte trustee attachment.

Reporter’s Notes: This rule makes major changes in the availability of and procedure for trustee process comparable to those made with regard to general attachment in Rule 4.1, and to that extent supersedes 12 V.S.A. §§ 3011-3164. The bulk of those provisions remain in effect, however, and are incorporated by reference in Rule 4.2(a). The rule adopts in essence the provisions of former County Court Rules 38 and 39A. For the substance of former County Court Rule 39 pertaining to costs in trustee cases, see Rule 54(f). Rule 4.2 has no federal equivalent, but is based in part on Maine Rule 4B. Trustee process under Rule 4.2(a) and (b), like general attachment, is permitted prior to the commencement of the action against all assets except earnings but may be had only upon order after the filing of the complaint and hearing and a showing that there is probable ground for plaintiff’s claim, that the amount attached is reasonable, and that there is good cause. These limitations upon trustee process are intended to implement the principles of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1. Further limitations upon trustee process against earnings, based upon the holding of that case, are incorporated in Rule 4.2(j). Because trustee process before judgment is thus restricted, pending legislation (1971-H. 326, § 224) would add 12 V.S.A. § 2731a to the statutes pertaining to execution to make clear that levy upon assets of the judgment debtor in the hands of another is permissible without prior attachment. The form of the trustee summons prescribed in Rule 4.2(c) differs considerably from the form provided by 12 V.S.A. § 5925 (now superseded). The summons, like ordinary process under Rule 4, is directed to the trustee rather than to the sheriff and is a separate document not to be incorporated in a writ of attachment or the summons to the defendant. Moreover, the summons contains the order authorizing its issuance. The form of the trustee summons is set out in the Appendix of Forms as Official Form 2A. As with other process, Rule 4.2(d) provides that plaintiff’s attorney is to deliver the summons to the person who will make service. The summons is filled out, signed, and issued by the clerk, pursuant to order, however. See Rule 4.2(b), (c). Note that 12 V.S.A. § 3087, requiring the plaintiff to give security for costs to the trustee, remains in force. See 1971-H. 326, § 74. After service of the trustee summons, a copy of it is to be served upon defendant with the summons and complaint. To insure that the order upon which the process is based reflects the current situation, service must be completed within 30 days after the filing of the complaint. This time may be extended under Rule 6(b), however, or subsequent trustee process may be allowed under Rule 4.2(i). Rule 4.2(e), also for purposes of compliance with Sniadach, provides for dissolution, modification, or discharge of the trustee attachment on motion in accordance with the procedure applicable to general attachment. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1. Rules 4.2(f) and (g) incorporate and modify the provisions of existing statutes for proceedings after service of the trustee’s disclosure. The provisions of Rule 4.2(f) for service of disclosure, interrogatories, and answers are based upon former County Court Rule 38. The procedure for notice and motion as to the time for the trustee’s examination is taken from Maine Rule 4B(d). Note that under Rule 67, a trustee who does not wish to contest the claim may pay the sum or deliver the property attached into court. Rule 4.2(h) makes clear that trustee process is available to any party who asserts an affirmative claim for relief. Rule 4.2(i) permits additional trustee process only upon court order. See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1(g). Rule 4.2(j) is taken with minor variations from former County Court Rule 39A, promulgated effective May 1, 1970, as a temporary measure. Very similar rules have subsequently been adopted in Maine and for the Massachusetts district courts. See Me.R.C.P. 4B(h), as amended effective July 1, 1970; Mass. Dist. Courts Directive, Garnishment Proceedings, April 10, 1970. The rule is intended to make Vermont practice consistent with the specific ruling of the United States Supreme Court as to wage garnishment in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See Reporter’s Notes to Rule 4.1. Cf. Heaton Hospital, Inc. v. Emrick, 128 Vt. 405, 264 A.2d 806 (1970). Rule 4.2(j)(1) makes trustee process against “earnings” (which under Rule 4.2(j)(4), discussed below, is defined to include wages and other forms of compensation) available only after judgment, thus satisfying the principal fault found by the Court in Sniadach, that property might be encumbered on a potentially nonmeritorious claim. This solution is much simpler than the alternative possibility of providing for a time-consuming pre-attachment hearing and accords maximum effect to the salutary policy expressed in Sniadach of giving the wage earner protection against unnecessary financial hardship. The rule, based on Maine Rule 4B(a), modifies the general statutory provision that actions may be commenced by trustee process with no exception for process against wages. 12 V.S.A. §§ 3011, 3012. Rule 4.2(j)(2) incorporates the principal provisions of Title III of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, P.L. 90- 321, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677, which imposes maximum limits upon the amount of “earnings” as defined in the Act that may be garnished to satisfy a debt and forbids any state or federal court to “make, execute or enforce any order or process in violation of” the Act. Under Section 303 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673, the maximum amount which may be garnished is the lesser of (1) 25% of defendant’s weekly disposable earnings or (2) the amount by which those earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage. For pay periods other than a week, the Secretary of Labor is to provide by regulation a means for computing the equivalent of the latter sum. The Act takes effect July 1, 1970. The rule expresses the requirements of the Act in terms of their practical effect. A sum equal to 30 times the federal minimum wage, which would presently be $48, is exempt from attachment in any case. If earnings are between $48 and $64 a week, the excess over $48 will be less than 25% of the total, so only that excess may be attached. When earnings are more than $64 a week, 25% will be the lesser amount and hence subject to attachment. Subparagraph (iii) of the rule simply incorporates the Secretary’s regulations for pay periods other than a week. Under these regulations the weekly figure is multiplied by the number of full weeks and fractions of a week in the pay period. For example, the figure for a monthly pay period would be 4 ⅓ times $48 or $208. See Regulations, 29 C.F.R. Ch. V, § 870.10(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 8227 (May 26, 1970). 12 V.S.A. § 3020(5) is no longer effective because it does not satisfy the federal standard. Under Section 305 of the federal Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1675, the Secretary may “exempt” from the statute’s pre-emptive bar state laws with restrictions “substantially similar” to the federal provisions. While no formal exemption has been granted for Vermont’s wage garnishment law under the regulations governing such exemptions, 29 C.F.R. Ch. V, §§ 870.50-870.56, 35 Fed. Reg. 8227 (May 26, 1970), the Reporter has been assured informally by the Regional Solicitor of the Department of Labor that the proposed rule satisfies the federal requirements. Note that Section 304 of the federal Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674, forbids discharge of any employee for garnishment where only one debt is involved and imposes criminal penalties for wilful violation. This provision has been implemented by 12 V.S.A. § 3165, forbidding discharge by reason of trustee process unless the employer has been previously summoned five times. Rule 4.2(j)(3), based on Maine Rule 4B(h), provides a procedure for attachment of earnings on trustee process. The rule provides for attachment within 30-day period during which an appeal lies and execution is stayed. See Appellate Rule 4(a); Rule 62(a). Thus, earnings attached are to be disclosed by the trustee and made available for satisfaction of the judgment as in the case of other assets attached on mesne process. This 30-day period for attachment may be extended by the court for cause shown under Rule 6(b). The last two sentences of the paragraph provide for issuance of summons to the trustee by the clerk on request of the judgment creditor, and for service of a copy of such summons upon the defendant. The requirement that the summons state the date and amount of the judgment is intended to protect the trustee against unauthorized use of trustee process. Rule 4.2(j)(4) incorporates verbatim the definitions of “earnings” and “disposable earnings” found in Section 302 of the federal Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1672. The definition of “earnings” makes clear that the entire rule applies to all forms of compensation, including payments under pension or retirement plans, thus eliminating a possible inequity. The definition of “disposable earnings” solves the otherwise difficult problem of what deductions from wages are to be included in the attachment. Those deductions “required by law to be withheld,” such as income and social security taxes, are excluded, while others, such as health insurance premiums for insurance not imposed by law, are included.