Rule 19.Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication

Reporter’s Notes: This rule is based on Federal Rule 19, with modifications appropriate to state practice taken from Maine Rule 19. The rule states pragmatic tests for determining when joinder of parties is necessary in order for the court adequately to dispose of the action and when, where joinder is necessary, the action should be dismissed in the absence of the parties who cannot be joined. The tests emphasize the effect of any judgment that might be rendered upon the rights and interests of both parties and nonparties. The rule leads to results consistent with the few Vermont cases pertaining to the problem. See e.g., Miele v. Miele, 124 Vt. 110, 197 A.2d 787 (1963); Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 A. 919 (1933); Leonard’s Admr. v. Leonard’s Exr., 67 Vt. 318, 31 A. 783 (1895). Cf. 12 V.S.A. §§ 5051-5060. Rule 19(a) sets out the tests by which the court is to decide whether a missing party is one who must be joined to protect either his own interests or those of persons already parties. Although the rule does not use the abstract label, such a party is one who would have been at least a “necessary” party in the terminology of the earlier cases. See Provident Tradesmen’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118-119 (1968). If such a party has not been joined and can be served with process, the court, on defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(7) or Rule 21, or on its own motion, must order him joined. The last sentence of the subdivision provides that a party who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be joined as a defendant, omitting the involuntary plaintiff provision technicality used only in patent litigation. See 3A Moore, Federal Practice § 19.06. If a party found to be “necessary” under Rule 19(a) cannot be served with process, then the court under Rule 19(b) must determine whether or not he is “indispensable” in the sense that the suit cannot proceed without him. The basic test of indispensability is one of “equity and good conscience,” articulated in four factors to be considered by the court, which reflect the actual effect of the proceeding upon the interests of parties and nonparties. The rule in effect requires the court to determine whether a particular party should be deemed indispensable, not by some abstract definition of the term, but in light of the precise circumstances of the particular case. For a demonstration of the application of these factors, see Provident Tradesmen’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra. Annotations Construction. Burden of persuasion. Construction with other law. Dismissal for nonjoinder. Particular cases. Construction. This rule is patterned after Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Grassy Brook Village, Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 439 A.2d 273 (1981). There are two distinct elements of this rule: first, whether the absent party is one who should be joined if feasible; and, second, whether the action should proceed without an absent party who should be joined. Grassy Brook Village, Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 439 A.2d 273, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 631 (1981). The criteria enumerated in subdivision (a) of this rule require the trial court to determine whether the claims of the parties, the factual circumstances of the case, and the appropriate legal authorities create a reasonable potential for inadequate or conflicting judgments. Grassy Brook Village, Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 439 A.2d 273, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 631 (1981). Burden of persuasion. The party moving for joinder bears the initial burden of advancing a cogent argument on why the absent party is needed to prevent inconsistent or inadequate judgments, and if the moving party is unable to satisfy this initial burden, the motion for joinder should be denied. Grassy Brook Village, Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 439 A.2d 273, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 631 (1981). In action in which the party moving for joinder failed to present one plausible theory of judgment in the case that would jeopardize the interest of the party sought to be joined or present one plausible theory of how any party would be exposed to double liability, the movant failed to satisfy his burden of advancing a cogent argument on why the absent party was needed to prevent inconsistent or inadequate judgments, and the motion for joinder was properly denied by the trial court. Grassy Brook Village, Inc. v. Richard D. Blazej, Inc., 140 Vt. 477, 439 A.2d 273, 1981 Vt. LEXIS 631 (1981). Where neither the record nor defendant claiming that certain person should have been joined as an indispensable party established the necessary basis for joinder, there was no error in failure to join as requested in defendant’s responsive pleading. Hudson v. Clark, 136 Vt. 553, 396 A.2d 132, 1978 Vt. LEXIS 667 (1978). Construction with other law. Statute which required that municipality be made a party in any declaratory judgment proceeding involving validity of a municipal ordinance essentially made town whose ordinance was at issue a “necessary” party within meaning of procedural rule. Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115, 743 A.2d 598, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1999). Supreme court could address validity of municipal ordinance notwithstanding trial court’s failure to order joinder of town and consider claims in first instance, since remand would undoubtedly result in a second appeal, issues were fully briefed and argued and carefully considered by supreme court, and town did not stand to be prejudiced by court’s consideration of claims. Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 170 Vt. 115, 743 A.2d 598, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 331 (1999). Dismissal for nonjoinder. Because Count 1 alleged that the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased a portion of a municipal airport from defendant city, used firefighting foams that contaminated plaintiffs' property with hazardous materials, the trial court properly concluded that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties to this claim and acted within its discretion in dismissing it. The Guard and the United States clearly had an interest in Count 1 and a finding on this count by a trial court could lead to inconsistent determinations of fault for the United States, which was currently involved in similar litigation in another court. Belter v. City of Burlington, 2025 VT 35, — Vt. —, 346 A.3d 903, 2025 Vt. LEXIS 70 (Vt. 2025). Trial court erred in dismissing Counts 2-5 and 7 on the ground that the United States and the Vermont Air National Guard were necessary parties, as these claims stemmed from the failure of defendant city, which leased part of its airport to the Guard, to prevent contaminated water from traveling onto plaintiffs' land, not the Guard's use at the airport of firefighting foam containing hazardous substances. The source of the contamination was not at issue; rather, plaintiffs' case had to do with what defendant did or did not do to limit the damage by containing the runoff from the foams on its own property. Belter v. City of Burlington, 2025 VT 35, — Vt. —, 346 A.3d 903, 2025 Vt. LEXIS 70 (Vt. 2025). In a declaratory judgment action brought by a property owner against a water cooperative, the cooperative’s motion to dismiss for failure to join other property owners was properly denied as untimely. A summary judgment adjudication was tantamount to a trial on the merits, and the cooperative failed to move to dismiss before the court granted summary judgment against it. 171234 Canada Inc. v. AHA Water Coop., 2008 VT 115, 184 Vt. 633, 968 A.2d 303, 2008 Vt. LEXIS 142 (2008) (mem.). In a declaratory judgment action seeking the location of a right-of-way trial court erred by determining the extent of a town highway since determination of that issue was not requested nor required to determine the location of the right-of-way and since determination of that issue required joinder of the town under this rule, since under chapter 7 of Title 19 it was an indispensable party. Griffith v. Nielsen, 141 Vt. 423, 449 A.2d 965, 1982 Vt. LEXIS 551 (1982). Unless dismissal is proper under this rule, failure to join a proper party will not terminate an action. Pillsbury v. Town of Wheelock, 130 Vt. 242, 290 A.2d 42, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1972). The issue as to whether dismissal for failure to join a proper party is proper or not is one to be raised in the trial court, since this rule requires that the proposed party be found to be indispensable in terms of subdivision (a) and not available to be joined under subdivision (b). Pillsbury v. Town of Wheelock, 130 Vt. 242, 290 A.2d 42, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1972). If the shaping of relief, attended by protective provisions in the judgment, can assure an unprejudicial result as to all interested parties, no dismissal will follow from failure to join a proper party. Pillsbury v. Town of Wheelock, 130 Vt. 242, 290 A.2d 42, 1972 Vt. LEXIS 263 (1972). Particular cases. Nature of the claims at issue—conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty—and the evidence in the record made it clear that, while they could have been added, defendant’s wife and two realty companies were not indispensable parties. If this case involved a breach of contract claim or another claim that relied heavily on specific corporate entities, instead of two individuals involved in a business conflict with significant personal undercurrents, the three parties might have been indispensable due to their potential corporate liability, but based on the claims asserted and evidence presented, defendant failed to establish that the three parties were needed to prevent an inconsistent or inadequate judgment. Beaudoin v. Feldman, 2018 VT 83, 208 Vt. 169, 196 A.3d 768, 2018 Vt. LEXIS 123 (2018). Because the State had an interest in Berlin Pond as public trustee, and protection of that interest might have been impaired in its absence by a decision in favor of the city, it was proper that the trial court ordered the State to be joined as a necessary party. And it was equally proper for the trial court subsequently to dismiss the State when, after being joined, the State refused to align its interests with either party. City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 2012 VT 32, 191 Vt. 441, 49 A.3d 120, 2012 Vt. LEXIS 32 (2012).