Chapter 3. Limitations of Actions · Article 2. Specific Periods of Limitation · Last amended 2019 · Last verified July 17, 2026
(1) As used in this subsection, the term “childhood sexual abuse” means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under 18 years of age and which would be in violation of:
(A) Rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-1;
(B) Sodomy or aggravated sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-2;
(C) Statutory rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-3;
(D) Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-4;
(E) Enticing a child for indecent purposes, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-5;
(F) Pandering, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-12;
(G) Reserved;
(H) Solicitation of sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-15;
(I) Incest, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22;
(J) Sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.1; or
(K) Aggravated sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.2.
(2) Notwithstanding Code Section 9-3-33 and except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section as it existed on June 30, 2017, any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse committed before July 1, 2015, shall be commenced on or before the date the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years.
(1) As used in this subsection, the term “childhood sexual abuse” means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under 18 years of age and which would be in violation of:
(A) Trafficking a person for sexual servitude, as prohibited in Code Section 16-5-46;
(B) Rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-1;
(C) Statutory rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-3, if the defendant was 21 years of age or older at the time of the act;
(D) Aggravated sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-2;
(E) Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-4, unless the violation would be subject to punishment as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Code Section 16-6-4 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-6-4;
(F) Enticing a child for indecent purposes, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-5, unless the violation would be subject to punishment as provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-6-5;
(G) Incest, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22;
(H) Aggravated sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.2; or
(I) Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16.
(2)
(A) Notwithstanding Code Section 9-3-33, any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse committed on or after July 1, 2015, shall be commenced:
(i) On or before the date the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years; or
(ii) Within two years from the date that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of such abuse and that such abuse resulted in injury to the plaintiff as established by competent medical or psychological evidence.
(B) When a plaintiff’s civil action is filed after the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years but within two years from the date that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of such abuse and that such abuse resulted in injury to the plaintiff, the court shall determine from admissible evidence in a pretrial finding when the discovery of the alleged childhood sexual abuse occurred. The pretrial finding required under this subparagraph shall be made within six months of the filing of the civil action.
(1) As used in this subsection, the term:
(A) “Entity” means an institution, agency, firm, business, corporation, or other public or private legal entity.
(B) “Person” means the individual alleged to have committed the act of childhood sexual abuse.
(2) If a civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse is commenced pursuant to division (b)(2)(A)(i) of this Code section and if the person was a volunteer or employee of an entity that owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, or the person and the plaintiff were engaged in some activity over which such entity had control, damages against such entity shall be awarded under this Code section only if by a preponderance of the evidence there is a finding of negligence on the part of such entity.
(3) If a civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse is commenced pursuant to division (b)(2)(A)(ii) of this Code section and if the person was a volunteer or employee of an entity that owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, or the person and the plaintiff were engaged in some activity over which such entity had control, damages against such entity shall be awarded under this Code section only if by a preponderance of the evidence there is a finding that there was gross negligence on the part of such entity, that the entity knew or should have known of the alleged conduct giving rise to the civil action and such entity failed to take remedial action.
Childhood sexual abuse often is not recognized, understood, or reported until long after it happens, and Georgia's general two-year personal injury period would leave many survivors with no realistic path to court. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 displaces that general rule with a framework built around the age of the victim rather than the date of the underlying wrong.
For abuse committed before July 1, 2015, the statute sets a single deadline: the civil action must be commenced by the date the plaintiff turns 23, subject to a narrow exception tied to a version of subsection (d) that existed on June 30, 2017. For abuse committed on or after July 1, 2015, the statute opens a second path — the plaintiff can still sue by age 23, or, if that birthday has already passed, within two years of the date the plaintiff knew or had reason to know both that the abuse happened and that it caused injury, backed by competent medical or psychological evidence. A suit filed after age 23 under that discovery path triggers a required pretrial finding, made within six months of filing, pinpointing when discovery occurred.
The statute treats institutional defendants differently depending on which path a plaintiff uses — but that framework reaches only abuse committed on or after July 1, 2015, under subsection (b). When a volunteer or employee of an entity that owed the plaintiff a duty of care committed the abuse, and the suit was filed under the age-23 path of subsection (b), the entity can be held liable on an ordinary negligence showing. But when the suit relies instead on the later discovery-based window, the entity is liable only on a showing of gross negligence — that the entity knew or should have known of the abuser's conduct and failed to take remedial action. That split reflects the statute's balance between opening a longer window for survivors and requiring a stronger showing against institutions when the claim arrives many years after the abuse. Subsection (c) never references subsection (a), so a claim for abuse committed before July 1, 2015 — which follows only the age-23 deadline in subsection (a) — has no corresponding negligence-standard provision governing institutional defendants under this section.
Code 1981, § 9-3-33.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2473, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 2-2/SB 8; Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 2/HB 17; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 9/SB 365; Ga. L. 2019, p. 74, § 2-1/SB 158.