(a) No private right of action shall arise from any Act enacted after July 1, 2010, unless such right is expressly provided therein.
§ 9-2-8.Private rights of action not created unless expressly stated
Chapter 2. Actions Generally · Article 1. General Provisions · Last amended 2010 · Last verified July 17, 2026
In one sentenceO.C.G.A. § 9-2-8 provides that no statute enacted after July 1, 2010 creates a private right of action unless the statute expressly says so, while preserving existing tort, contract, and other common-law theories of recovery for breach of legal or private duties imposed by law.
Full Text of § 9-2-8
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be construed to prevent the breach of any duty imposed by law from being used as the basis for a cause of action under any theory of recovery otherwise recognized by law, including, but not limited to, theories of recovery under the law of torts or contract or for breach of legal or private duties as set forth in Code Sections 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 or in Title 13.
Plain-English Summary
Legislatures write plenty of statutes that impose duties — safety requirements, licensing rules, reporting obligations — without saying who, if anyone, can sue over a violation. This section answers that question for any Georgia Act passed after July 1, 2010: no private right of action arises unless the statute says so in plain terms.
That default cuts off a practice courts sometimes engage in of implying a private remedy from a regulatory statute that never mentioned one. If the legislature wants private citizens to be able to sue for a violation of a new law, it has to write that permission into the statute itself.
Subsection (b) draws a boundary around how far the rule reaches. It doesn’t touch the tort and contract theories Georgia courts already recognize, and it doesn’t stop a plaintiff from using a statutory duty as evidence of a breach under an existing theory of recovery, including the duties Georgia law elsewhere ties to negligence and contract claims. The section blocks brand-new statutory causes of action from arising by implication, not the common-law and contract claims that predate it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I sue based on a Georgia statute that doesn’t mention a private right of action?
Not if the statute was enacted after July 1, 2010. Subsection (a) states that no private right of action arises from such an Act unless the right is expressly provided in it.
Does this section eliminate ordinary negligence or contract claims?
No. Subsection (b) preserves the use of a breach of a legal duty as the basis for a cause of action under existing theories such as tort or contract law.
What if a statute passed before July 1, 2010 doesn’t mention a private right of action?
The section applies to Acts enacted after that date; its text does not address statutes enacted on or before July 1, 2010.
How does a statute “expressly provide” a private right of action?
The section doesn’t spell out a specific formula; it requires only that the right be expressly provided in the Act, as opposed to left for a court to infer.
Does this section affect duties recognized elsewhere in Georgia law, like Code Sections 51-1-6 and 51-1-8?
No. Subsection (b) specifically preserves theories of recovery based on those Code sections and on Title 13, along with tort and contract law generally.
Amendment History
Code 1981, § 9-2-8, enacted by Ga. L. 2010, p. 745, § 2/SB 138.
Source & verification. Section text and amendment history are
reproduced verbatim from the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, published by the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Georgia Code Revision Commission / LexisNexis. Last verified July 17, 2026.
· Official source
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