§ 9-13-57.Choses in action
Chapter 13. Executions and Judicial Sales · Article 3. Property Against Which Execution Levied · Last amended 1933 · Last verified July 17, 2026
Full Text of § 9-13-57
Plain-English Summary
A chose in action is a right to sue or collect rather than a physical thing — a debt owed to the defendant, a claim for damages, or some other intangible right that has not yet been reduced to money or property in hand. This section states the default rule for that category: a chose in action cannot be seized and sold to satisfy an execution.
The rule is not absolute. The statute leaves room for other laws to override it, but only if they do so specially — a statute has to make a particular kind of chose in action subject to execution by name, rather than leaving courts to infer that intent from a general grant of collection power. Absent that kind of specific statutory authorization, the default prohibition controls.
The distinction matters because a defendant's assets are not limited to land, goods, and cash sitting in a bank account. A defendant might hold valuable claims against other people — unpaid debts, pending lawsuits, insurance claims — and this section marks those claims as generally beyond a sheriff's reach absent a statute saying otherwise.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a sheriff seize a debtor's right to sue someone else and sell that claim at auction?
Generally no. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-57 provides that choses in action are not liable to be seized and sold under execution unless a statute specially makes them so.
What counts as a chose in action?
A right to collect or sue rather than physical property — such as a debt owed to the defendant, a pending claim, or another intangible right not yet reduced to money or property in hand.
Are there exceptions to this rule?
Yes. The prohibition yields when some other statute specially provides that a particular chose in action can be seized and sold, rather than leaving that authority to be assumed generally.
Why would Georgia law protect choses in action from execution by default?
The statute does not explain its reasoning, but the practical effect is to keep intangible, hard-to-value claims out of forced sales absent a specific legislative decision to allow it.
Does this section prevent a creditor from ever reaching a debtor's claims against others?
It sets the default rule against seizure and sale by execution specifically; other collection mechanisms Georgia law provides may still apply where a statute authorizes them.
Amendment History
Orig. Code 1863, § 3501; Code 1868, § 3524; Code 1873, § 3582; Code 1882, § 3582; Civil Code 1895, § 5353; Civil Code 1910, § 5948; Code 1933, § 39-113.