§ 8.01-50.Action for death by wrongful act; how and when to be brought.
Chapter 3. Actions · Article 5. Death by Wrongful Act · Last amended 2012 · Last verified July 16, 2026
Full Text of § 8.01-50
Plain-English Summary
Section 8.01-50 is the source of Virginia’s wrongful death claim. Subsection A says that whenever a wrongful act, neglect, or default causes a death, and that same conduct would have supported a lawsuit had the injured person lived, the party who would have been liable stays liable — now to a wrongful death action instead. This holds even where a ship or vessel is involved, and even where the conduct that caused the death would also count as a felony; the criminal character of the act does not block the civil claim.
Subsection B extends a related claim to a fetal death, as defined in § 32.1-249, caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default. The natural mother — defined in subsection E as the woman carrying the child — may sue the tortfeasor directly. The statute is careful to close off a different claim: nothing in this section lets anyone sue the natural mother herself over the fetal death.
Subsection C assigns who must bring each action. A subsection A claim belongs to the personal representative of the deceased person. A subsection B fetal death claim belongs to the natural mother, though if she dies or becomes a person under a disability as defined in § 8.01-2, the administrator of her estate, her guardian, or her qualified personal representative can step in. Where a fetal death claim proceeds under the medical malpractice chapter and the same wrongful act also caused another fetal death or injured or killed the mother, total recovery cannot exceed the cap on damages for a single patient set out in § 8.01-581.15. Whoever brings a subsection B action may compromise it under § 8.01-55, with any recovery distributed under this article, and every action under this section must be brought within the time limits set by § 8.01-244.
Subsection D addresses who administers the estate of a deceased infant who was in a parent’s custody under a court order or written agreement: that parent gets first priority for administration, though the parent may waive the right in favor of someone else. If no such parent or designee applies within 30 days of the infant’s death, administration proceeds as it would in any other case.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is allowed to file a wrongful death lawsuit in Virginia?
The personal representative of the deceased person files a claim arising from an ordinary wrongful death under subsection A. A fetal death claim under subsection B belongs to the natural mother, or, if she has died or become disabled, to the administrator of her estate, her guardian, or her personal representative.
Does it matter if the conduct that caused the death was also a crime?
No. Subsection A specifically preserves the civil claim even when the death occurred under circumstances that would amount to a felony. The criminal nature of the conduct does not shield the responsible party from wrongful death liability.
Can a mother sue over the wrongful-act-caused death of a fetus?
Yes. Subsection B lets the natural mother — the woman carrying the child — bring an action against whoever’s wrongful act, neglect, or default caused the fetal death. The section is explicit, though, that it creates no claim against the natural mother herself.
Is there a deadline for filing a wrongful death claim?
Yes. Subsection C requires every action under this section, whether for an adult decedent or a fetal death, to be brought within the time limits set out in § 8.01-244.
Who has priority to administer the estate of a deceased infant?
Under subsection D, if the infant was in a parent’s custody under a court order or written agreement with the other parent, that custodial parent has first priority to administer the estate, though the parent can waive that right in favor of another person. If no one applies within 30 days of the death, administration proceeds under the ordinary rules.
Amendment History
Code 1950, § 8-633; 1958, c. 470; 1977, c. 617; 1981, c. 115; 2012, c. 725.