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§ 8.01-256.As to rights and remedies existing when this chapter takes effect.

Chapter 4. Limitations of Actions · Article 5. Miscellaneous Limitations Provisions · Last amended 1977 · Last verified July 16, 2026

In one sentenceSection 8.01-256 is Chapter 4’s savings clause: pending cases and already-existing but unfiled claims as of October 1, 1977, keep whatever limitation rule would have applied without the chapter, and any new or different limitation period the chapter created applies only to causes of action accruing on or after that date.

Full Text of § 8.01-256

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No action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding which is pending before October 1, 1977, shall be barred by this chapter, and any action, suit, scire facias or other proceeding so pending shall be subject to the same limitation, if any, which would have been applied if this chapter had not been enacted. If a cause of action, as to which no action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such cause of action shall be the same, if any, as would apply had this chapter not been enacted. Any new limitation period imposed by this chapter, where no limitation previously existed or which is different from the limitation existing before this chapter was enacted, shall apply only to causes or rights of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977.

Plain-English Summary

When Virginia enacted Chapter 4 as part of the 1977 recodification, it needed a rule for handling cases and claims that existed under the old law when the new chapter took effect on October 1, 1977. Section 8.01-256 is that rule. For any action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding already pending before October 1, 1977, the chapter does not create a new bar; that pending matter stays subject to whatever limitation period, if any, would have applied had the chapter never been enacted.

The section extends the same protection to claims that existed but had not yet been filed. If a cause of action existed before October 1, 1977, and no proceeding on it was pending, the chapter does not apply to it, and the limitation period for that claim remains whatever it would have been under the prior law. Only where the chapter imposed a new limitation period, where none existed before, or a different one than existed before, does that new or different period apply — and even then, only to causes or rights of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977.

Together these rules keep the 1977 recodification from retroactively shortening or eliminating rights that litigants and claimants already held, while still letting the new chapter’s periods govern everything that arose afterward. Later sections throughout the chapter, including § 8.01-251(D) governing judgment enforcement, expressly cross-reference this section to make clear that its transition rule still applies to them.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did Chapter 4’s enactment in 1977 change the limitation period for cases already pending in court?

No. Section 8.01-256 provides that any action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding pending before October 1, 1977, remains subject to the same limitation period, if any, that would have applied had the chapter not been enacted.

What about a claim that existed before October 1, 1977, but no lawsuit had been filed on it yet?

The chapter does not apply to it, and the limitation period for that cause of action remains whatever it would have been without the chapter’s enactment.

Does a new limitation period created by Chapter 4 apply to claims that arose before October 1, 1977?

No. Any new limitation period the chapter imposed, where none existed before or where it differs from the prior limitation, applies only to causes or rights of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977.

Why does this section matter today, decades after the 1977 recodification?

Other sections in the chapter, such as § 8.01-251(D), still cross-reference Section 8.01-256 as part of their own operative rules, so its transition principle continues to matter whenever a limitation question traces back to law that predates the recodification.

Does Section 8.01-256 create any new limitation periods itself?

No. It is a transition and savings provision that determines which version of the law applies to pending or pre-existing claims; the substantive limitation periods themselves appear elsewhere in the chapter.

Amendment History

Code 1950, § 8-37; 1977, c. 617.

Source & verification. Section text and amendment history are reproduced verbatim from the Code of Virginia, published by the Code of Virginia, Virginia Division of Legislative Automated Systems. Last verified July 16, 2026. · Official source
Also known as: virginia 1977 recodification statute of limitations8.01-256 savings clause limitationschapter 4 effective date virginia statute of limitationspending case 1977 limitation period virginiatransitional rule virginia limitations chapter