§ 8.01-445.Distinction between term and vacation abolished; effect of time.
Chapter 17. Judgments and Decrees Generally · Article 4. Distinction Between Term and Vacation Abolished · Last amended 1977 · Last verified July 16, 2026
Full Text of § 8.01-445
Plain-English Summary
Courts once operated on formal terms, with certain acts reserved for when court was in session and others available only in vacation. Section 8.01-445 sweeps that distinction away for Virginia’s civil courts. A court is no longer limited by whether it happens to be within a term when it needs to act.
The practical effect touches two things. First, any deadline for doing an act or taking a proceeding runs on its own schedule — it is not paused, extended, or otherwise affected by whether a term of court is ongoing or has expired. Second, the court’s authority to act in a pending civil action does not depend on term status at all: the continued existence or expiration of a term never limits what the court may do in a case already before it.
The result is a simpler calendar. Parties and courts track statutory and rule-based deadlines directly, without layering the old term-and-vacation calendar on top of them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does the existence of a court term still limit what a court can do in a pending civil action?
No. Section 8.01-445 says the continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the court’s power to act or take any proceeding in a pending civil action.
Are deadlines for taking action in a case affected by whether a term of court has ended?
No. The period of time provided for doing an act or taking a proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a term.
Did Virginia used to distinguish between what a court could do in term versus in vacation?
Yes, and Section 8.01-445 abolishes that distinction.
Does this section apply to civil actions specifically?
Yes, the section speaks to the court’s power to act in a pending civil action.
What is the practical result of abolishing the term-vacation distinction?
A court’s authority to act on a pending civil matter, and the running of applicable time periods, no longer depends on whether a term of court is in progress.
Amendment History
1977, c. 617.