(a) Actions for License Revocation or Suspension. Actions in the District Court under 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(9) seeking revocation or suspension of a license issued by a state licensing agency pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 184 shall be governed by this rule.
Rule 80G.Actions for License Revocation or Suspension
Last amended January 1, 2001 · Last verified July 8, 2026
In one sentenceRule 80G governs a District Court action to revoke or suspend a state-issued license under 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(9) and § 184, including the ex parte emergency-revocation procedure available on a showing of immediate threat to public health, safety, or welfare, and requires written findings before judgment.
Full Text of Rule 80G
(b) Complaint and Service of Process. The action shall be commenced by complaint filed in the District Court. The complaint must allege the violation of a cited statute or rule and the relief requested. The complaint and summons shall be served as required by 4 M.R.S.A. § 184.
(c) Emergency Revocation or Suspension of License. Upon the filing of a verified complaint or complaint accompanied by affidavits demonstrating an immediate threat to the public health, safety or welfare, the court ex parte may order the temporary revocation or suspension of a license pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 184 (6). The court shall promptly order expedited notice and hearing on the complaint. A temporary order of revocation or suspension shall expire within 30 days of issuance unless renewed after notice and hearing.
(d) Trial. Trial of the action shall be as provided in these rules.
(e) Judgment. The parties may not dispose of the action by agreement or consent decree without the approval of the court. The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by 4 M.R.S.A. § 184(7). Upon entry of judgment, the clerk shall serve each party with a copy of the judgment, including any separate opinion, findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the judgment, and with a statement describing appellate rights to seek review of the judgment.
Advisory Committee’s Notes & Reporter’s Notes
Advisory Committee’s Notes — January 1, 2001
Former Rule 80G prescribed the procedure for separate support and custody proceedings. The Rule was abrogated, effective February 15, 1992, since the procedure was superseded by statutory and rule changes. New Rule 80G now prescribes the procedure for actions for license revocation or suspension. P.L. 1999, c. 547, section B-6 enacted 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(9) to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the District Court for actions to revoke or to suspend licenses issued by certain state licensing agencies, effective March 15, 2001. P.L. 1999, c. 547, section B-10 enacted 4 M.R.S.A. § 184 to prescribe the procedure for such actions. 4 M.R.S.A. § 184(9) provides that the Supreme Judicial Court may adopt rules governing the procedure.
New Rule 80G incorporates the explicit requirements for procedure set forth in 4 M.R.S.A. § 184. Consequently, the Rule must be read in harmony with the requirements of the statute. The procedure is simple, but has explicit requirements for the content of the complaint, for expedited hearings, and for entry of judgment or approval of negotiated dispositions. The statutes also contains explicit directions requiring the witnesses be sworn and an “official record” be maintained of the testimony and exhibits (4 M.R.S.A. § 184(3) and (4)), but these requirements are not different from those governing civil trial generally. Consequently, subdivision (d) of the Rule provides that the trial of the action shall be as provided generally for civil trials.
P.L. 1999, c. 547, section B-6 also enacted 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(10), governing appeals from disciplinary decisions of occupational licensing boards and commissions. That procedure is prescribed by amendments to Rule 80C promulgated this date.
Advisory Committee's Note — November 15, 1976
[Editor’s Note: This Note refers to a version of the Rule when it concerned separate support and custody, abrogated in 1992].
This rule is added to implement the provisions of 19 M.R.S.A. § 304, enacted in 1973, that actions for civil support may be commenced by summons rather than on order of notice under 19 M.R.S.A. § 301 as formerly, and that the Law Court may "prescribe by general rule the procedure" for such actions. The rule thus provides a procedure for willful non-support actions under 19 M.R.S.A. § 301 and for enforcement of the general support obligation under 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 441-452. The rule also includes proceedings for custody and support under 19 M.R.S.A. § 214, because the procedure for such actions is virtually identical to that under § 301. Proceedings under 19 M.R.S.A. § 401 (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act), 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 491-516 (alternative method of support enforcement), and 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 3791-3800 (custody and support of neglected children) are excluded because those statutes contain ample and complex procedural provisions that do not fit the pattern of this rule. See, generally, 2 Field, McKusick, and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice 512-513 (2d ed. 1970). Rule 81(b)(3), which formerly excluded all separate support actions has been amended to exclude only URESA actions. A comparable Rule 80G has been added to the District Court Civil Rules and a comparable change has been made in D.C.C.R. 81(b). The present rule is numbered "80G" for uniformity of numbering with the District Court Civil Rules, where the numbers 80C-80F have already been used. The latter numbers in the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure are "reserved" for future rules that do not have a District Court equivalent.
Rule 80G and D.C.C.R. 80G supersede the procedure of the enumerated statutes for separate support and custody actions in the Superior and District Courts. The statutory procedure remains in effect, however, for such proceedings brought in the Probate Courts, where these rules do not apply. Note also that the new rules apply only in the relatively rare situation where support or custody is sought independent of an action for divorce or judicial separation. If a divorce or separation is also sought, Rule 80 and D.C.C.R. 80 (incorporated by D.C.C.R. 80C for separations) continue to govern support and custody, and the new rules are inapplicable. The differences are minor, however, because Rule 80G and D.C.C.R. 80G adopt a procedure very similar to that now provided by Rule 80 (and incorporated in D.C.C.R. 80) for divorce. Although the new rules supersede the prior statutes, the intent is to carry forward in simplified form the summary procedures of those statutes where they are necessary to meet immediate needs of the plaintiff or minor children. At the same time, the rules preserve the ability of a defendant to raise a genuine defense through appropriate procedures.
Rule 80G(a) makes the rule applicable to actions for support of a husband as well as of a wife or minor child. Although the action provided by 19 M.R.S.A. § 301 for willful nonsupport lies only against a husband, the general support obligation of a woman under 19 M.R.S.A. § 443 extends to "her husband ... when in need."
Rule 80G(b) is based on Rule 80(b), except that the third sentence tracks 19 M.R.S.A. § 394, prescribing the contents of a URESA petition. An action under this rule may thus be readily converted into a URESA proceeding if circumstances warrant. Note that service outside the state under Rules 4(e) and (f) was held invalid to sustain a support order against a nonresident in Stanley v. Stanley, 271 A.2d 636 (Me.1970), and Rule 4(f) in terms does not extend to separate custody proceedings. The recent amendment to the long arm statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A, enacted by 1975 Laws, c. 770, § 80, provides in subd. (2) (G) that "Maintaining a domicile in this State while subject to a marital or family relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, property settlement, child support, or child custody; or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to such a claim"
is an act the doing of which submits the actor to the jurisdiction of the Maine courts. In addition, subd. (2)(I) of the amended statute extends jurisdiction to "any other relation to the State or to persons or property" sufficient to create a constitutional basis for such jurisdiction. Presumably, by virtue of these amendments, out-of-state service under Rule (3) in support and custody matters is more widely available than previously.
Rule 80G(c) is basically similar to Rule 80(c) as amended simultaneously with the adoption of this rule. See Advisory Committee's Note to that amendment. This rule does not contain the provision of Rule 80(c) for an order barring restraint on personal liberty of the other spouse.
Rule 80G(d) is based on Rule 80(d). Defendant may contest custody and the amount of support without filing an answer but must raise an issue as to liability for support by answer.
Rule 80G(e) is identical to Rule 80(e) as amended simultaneously with the adoption of this rule. See Advisory Committee's Note to that amendment. Nothing is gained by requiring a separate action when a defendant sued for support or custody wishes to inject the question of divorce.
Plain-English Summary
An action seeking revocation or suspension of a license issued by a state licensing agency, brought under 4 M.R.S.A. § 152(9) and § 184, is commenced by complaint in the District Court, alleging the specific statute or rule violated and the relief sought, served as the statute requires. When a verified complaint or supporting affidavits show an immediate threat to public health, safety, or welfare, the court can order a temporary revocation or suspension ex parte, promptly followed by expedited notice and a hearing; that temporary order expires within 30 days unless renewed after notice and hearing.
Trial proceeds under the ordinary civil rules. The parties can't dispose of the case by agreement or consent decree without the court's approval, and before judgment the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as the statute requires. Once judgment enters, the clerk serves each party with a copy, including any separate opinion and the supporting findings and conclusions, along with a statement describing the party's appellate rights.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a license be suspended before a full hearing is held?
Yes, on a verified complaint or supporting affidavits showing an immediate threat to public health, safety, or welfare, the court can order a temporary revocation or suspension ex parte, but that order expires within 30 days unless renewed after notice and hearing.
Can the parties settle a license revocation action on their own?
Not without the court's approval — the parties may not dispose of the action by agreement or consent decree without court approval.
What must the court do before entering judgment in a license revocation case?
Make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by 4 M.R.S.A. § 184(7), and, once judgment enters, the clerk serves each party a copy of the judgment, the findings and conclusions, and a statement of appellate rights.
Source & verification. The rule text and Advisory Committee’s Notes / Reporter’s
Notes are reproduced verbatim from the official Maine Rules of Civil Procedure (Me. R. Civ. P. 80G), prescribed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (4 M.R.S. § 8, the Rules Enabling Act). The plain-English summary is original and written by us. Last verified July 8, 2026. ·
Official source
Also known as: license revocation Maine District Courtlicense suspension actionemergency ex parte license suspension