Rule 8.General Rules of Pleading
Last amended May 1, 2000 · Last verified July 8, 2026
Full Text of Rule 8
Advisory Committee’s Notes & Reporter’s Notes
Advisory Committee’s Notes — May 1, 2000
The summary sheet requirement of Rule 8(a) is moved to Rule 5(h).
In subdivision (c), the reference to contributory negligence is changed to comparative fault, a reference to immunity is added, “co-employee” is substituted for “fellow servant” and, a meaningless reference to “on terms” is eliminated.
Advisory Committee's Note — April 15, 1975
The Law Court has now held that the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence in all circumstances. Crocker v. Coombs, 328 A.2d 389 (Me. 1974); Isaacson v. Husson College, 332 A.2d 757 (Me.1975). It is appropriate to make contributory negligence also an affirmative defense for pleading purposes in all instances.
Reporter's Notes — December 1, 1959
This rule is substantially the same as Federal Rule 8, but very different from present Maine practice. The "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" demands less particularity of allegation than is necessary in Maine to survive a demurrer. See, e. g., Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950). Form 9 in the Appendix of Forms illustrates that a general allegation of negligence at a stated time and place will suffice in a motor vehicle tort case. The intent and effect of the rule is to permit a claim to be stated in general terms, but the pleader must nevertheless supply adequate factual information to disclose the basis of his claim for relief. To compel detailed particularization would encourage fruitless battles over the mere form of statement and might stop a plaintiff at the threshold of the litigation by dismissal for failure to state a claim when the facts upon which he must rely are known only to the defendant and will have to be elicited by discovery. The rule must be read with awareness that if the defendant needs more information than the complaint discloses, the discovery devices are designed for this purpose.
Despite the permitted generality of allegation, a plaintiff may well find it in his enlightened self-interest to make his allegations more informative than the rules require. By use of the discovery devices the defendant will be able to get any needed additional information, and the plaintiff may often spare himself the time and cost involved in discovery by stating his claim in more specific terms than necessary to defeat either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12.
Rule 8(b) is intended to prevent the indiscriminate use of the general issue or general denial in the typical situation where much of the plaintiff's complaint is in fact not in controversy.
Rule 8(c) lists affirmative defenses which must be specially pleaded. In general, these are matters not open under the general issue which are now raised by brief statement. R.S.1954, Chap. 113, Sec. 36. Payment, which is now open under the general issue, Hibbard v. Collins, 127 Me. 383, 143 A. 600 (1928), would have to be pleaded as an affirmative defense under the rule. This subdivision is like Federal Rule 8(c) except that it incorporates R.S.1954, Chap. 113, Sec. 50,* which makes contributory negligence an affirmative defense only in wrongful death cases and personal injury actions where the plaintiff has died before trial. Under the federal rule, the burden of pleading contributory negligence is on the defendant in all cases.
Rule 8(e) (2) permits pleading in the alternative or in hypothetical form. This is a change in Maine law. Macurda v. Lewiston Journal Co., 104 Me. 554, 72 A.490 (1908).
Rule 8(g) is not in the federal rule. The idea is borrowed from a recent New York statute, N.Y.Civil Practice Act, Sec. 218-a, and the phraseology follows closely a revision of the statute recommended by the New York Temporary Commission on the Courts in 1957.
* [Field, McKusick & Wroth note: “Repealed by 1959 Laws, c. 317, § 176, and substantially re- enacted in 1967 as 14 M.R.S.A. § 160. See § 8.7.” 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice at 191 (2d ed. 1970).]
Plain-English Summary
Rule 8 keeps pleading simple by design. A claim needs only a short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief, plus a demand for judgment; a party can demand alternative or inconsistent relief without penalty. A defense needs only a short and plain response to each averment, admitting or denying it, or stating a lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief, which itself counts as a denial. Subdivision (c) then requires certain defenses — the rule lists more than twenty, from accord and satisfaction to waiver — to be raised affirmatively rather than buried in a general denial.
Two consequences follow directly from how a party pleads. Under subdivision (d), any averment that calls for a response but does not get one denied is treated as admitted. And under subdivision (g), parties can skip the formal complaint-and-answer structure altogether and instead file a joint signed statement specifying the claims, defenses, and relief they agree are at issue — useful when the parties agree on the shape of the dispute but not its outcome.
Frequently Asked Questions
What must a claim for relief contain under Rule 8(a)?
A short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the judgment sought; relief may be demanded in the alternative or of several different types.
What happens if a party doesn't respond to an averment in a complaint?
Under subdivision (d), any averment in a pleading requiring a response that is not denied is treated as admitted, except averments about the amount of damages.
What are affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c)?
A specific list of defenses — including accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, comparative fault, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, fraud, immunity, release, res judicata, the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations, and waiver, among others — that a party must raise affirmatively rather than through a general denial.