Rule 54.Judgments; Costs
Last amended January 1, 2003 · Last verified July 8, 2026
Full Text of Rule 54
Advisory Committee’s Notes & Reporter’s Notes
Advisory Note — January 1, 2003
The purposes of this amendment to M.R. Civ. P. 54(g) are to: (1) allow compensation for expert witnesses who appear at trial by deposition in the same manner as compensation for expert witnesses who testify live at trial, see Poland v. Webb, 1998 ME 104, ¶¶ 12-15, 711 A.2d 1278, 1280-82; and, (2) allow recovery of costs for videotaping or other recording and for any necessary editing and any costs for presenting a deposition at trial in lieu of live testimony. With this amendment, costs may be recovered incident to any use and presentation of a deposition at trial in lieu of live testimony.
Advisory Committee’s Notes — May 1, 2000
The last sentence of subdivision (f) refers to compensation to clerks or referees in damages hearings to be set by a justice but paid by the county. The counties have no such role at this time and the sentence is eliminated.
Advisory Committee’s Notes — May 1, 1999
Rule 54 (f) is amended to remove the schedule of fees, many of which were outdated, and to substitute an incorporation by reference of the governing statutes and administrative orders that may prescribe fees recoverable as costs. In addition, the rule now recognizes that process is frequently served by process servers whose fees should be recoverable as costs.
Advisory Committee’s Notes — March 1, 1994
Rule 54(b) is amended to clarify the situation regarding finality of a judgment on the merits in a case where there is also a claim for attorney fees. In such a case, of course, the initial order of judgment may expressly include attorney fees as well as the judgment on the merits. If the judgment is silent as to attorney fees, however, new Rule 54(b)(2) provides that the judgment is final as to all substantive claims which it embraces (subject, of course, to the further provisions of Rule 54(b)(1) concerning a judgment on less than all of the substantive claims). Only if the court expressly finds that the claim for attorney fees “is integral to the relief sought” and defers decision on that claim, is the judgment on the substantive claims rendered non-final. The purpose of the rule is to enable the parties to be clear on the question of finality. The rule differs from the practice established in the federal courts under Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988), in which the Court adopted a “bright line rule” providing that the decision on the merits was always final whether or not the issue of attorney fees had been considered. The nature of state court litigation requires a more flexible rule. In matters such as divorce and mortgage foreclosure, attorney fees are in effect a part of the substantive remedy being awarded the prevailing party. In that sense, they are integral to the relief sought. Cf. Crossman v. Maccoccio, 792 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986). The rule is consistent with Law Court decisions permitting consideration of attorney fees issues after judgment on the merits. Cf. Peterson v. Leonard, 622 A.2d 87, 89-90 (Me. 1993) (on appeal disposing of merits of contempt motion in divorce action, remand for consideration of attorney fees); Rodrigues v. Tomes, 610 A.2d 262, 265 (Me. 1992) (in wrongful eviction proceedings under 14 M.R.S.A. § 6014(2)(b), attorney fees could be awarded on motion to amend judgment).
New Rule 54(b)(3) provides a procedure for addressing an application for attorney fees after final judgment on other claims pursuant to paragraph (2). If there is no appeal, the application for fees must be filed within 60 days after entry of judgment. If there is an appeal, the application may be filed at any time between entry of judgment and 30 days after final disposition of the case, which ordinarily will be the entry of judgment in the lower court after receipt of the mandate. (A simultaneous amendment to Rule 73(f) adds actions under this paragraph to the list of those that the Superior Court may take after the appeal has been docketed in the Law Court.) Rule 54(b)(3) is similar to Rule 32 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Rule 54(b)(3) also provides that, to assure continuity, attorney fees issues are, in the usual case, to be acted upon by the judge who decided the issues on the merits.
Advisory Committee's Note — December 1, 1975
This amendment permits taxable costs on depositions to include the cost not only of the original transcript but also of one copy. As a practical matter, in most cases the attorney for either party, whether or not he is taking the deposition, needs to have a copy of the transcript in order adequately to prepare for trial. The original filed in the court can be used only with considerable inconvenience.
It should be emphasized that the first sentence of Rule 54 (g) makes the taxing of costs in the taking of depositions subject to the discretion of the court. This discretion extends to the scope of such taxable costs as well as the question whether any taxable costs will be allowed. There may be some situations where a copy of the deposition transcript was unnecessary in the preparation of the case and so taxable costs, even though otherwise allowable, would be denied for that item. Needless to say, taxable costs would not include the cost of a copy of the transcript if in fact such cost was not incurred by the party to whom costs are awarded.
Advisory Committee's Note — April 15, 1975
As originally promulgated, Rule 54(b) began "When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action . . . ." Federal Rule 54(b) begins "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved . . . ." Although no substantive difference whatever is intended between the two rules, the Maine Rule is open to a possible construction of being more limited than the Federal Rule. It might be argued that the Maine Rule applies only to multiple claims asserted in the complaint. To avoid any such unintended construction, Rule 54(b) is amended to conform to the Federal Rule.
Advisory Committee's Note — December 31, 1967
This amendment, although it changes the appearance of Rule 54(f) substantially, makes no drastic change in present practice. It increases the fees payable to attorneys as costs, to make them more realistic in view of present practice and to eliminate the odd amounts previously provided, e. g., $3.60 for a summons and complaint. The provision for costs of $5.00 for the drawing and filing of a conditional judgment comes from 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502. Taxing costs for the pleadings of a successful defendant in the same amount, as are taxed for the plaintiff's summons and complaint, carries out the even-handed treatment of the parties contemplated by 14 M.R.S.A. § 1501.
The amendment to subdivision (f) (2), which provides for miscellaneous items of costs collected by the Clerk of the Superior Court for the use of the county, eliminates some confusion that previously existed. The present subdivision (f) (2) is for the most part a copy of 4 M.R.S.A. § 555. By eliminating the itemized list from the rule it is hoped that some confusion caused by periodic statutory changes not reflected in the rule will be avoided.
Reporter's Notes — December 1, 1959
This rule is like Federal Rule 54 with minor differences and the addition of three subdivisions not found in the federal rule.
Rule 54(a) defines a judgment as including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. With law and equity merged into a single form of action it is natural that there should be no distinction between a judgment at law and a decree in equity and that there should be a single method of appellate review.
The method of review under these rules is by appeal from the judgment. This is not unlike the present appeal in equity under R.S.1954, Chap. 107, Sec. 21 (repealed in 1959), but it is strikingly different from the existing modes of obtaining appellate review in law cases. The fundamental point to be made is that in all cases, whether sounding in law or in equity, the end result in the trial court is a judgment. Judgment upon a jury verdict is entered "forthwith" by the clerk. Rule 58. At present judgment generally is entered as of the last day of the term in which the verdict was rendered; but if meanwhile a bill of exceptions has been filed, there is no entry of judgment. The case is marked "Law" and continued until after the Law Court has acted. R.S.1954, Chap. 103, Sec. 15 (amended in 1959) [now 4 M.R.S.A. § 57].
Rule 54(b) deals with judgment on multiple claims and provides that the court may direct the entry of a final judgment on one or more but less than all of such claims upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. The rule serves a purpose in the light of the provisions for substantially unlimited joinder of claims and parties. Since there may be several unrelated claims in the same action, injustice might result if judgment had to be delayed until the final adjudication of all of them. If the trial court makes the determination called for under this rule, there may be an immediate appeal. The rule does not, however, make appealable any order that does not finally dispose of one or more claims. It should be noted that in appropriate circumstances the court may stay the enforcement of a partial judgment entered under this rule. Rule 62(h).
Rule 54(c) provides that a judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that demanded in the complaint. In all other situations a party can get the relief to which he is entitled even if he has not demanded it. He may, for example, be awarded a larger amount of damages than he alleged. Couto v. United Fruit Co., 203 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.1953). This is contrary to present Maine law. Jeffery v. Sheehan, 135 Me. 246, 194 A. 543 (1937). He may be granted damages when he prayed for equitable relief, or equitable relief when he prayed for money damages. This also is a departure from Maine law. See Wolf v. W. S. Jordan Co., 146 Me. 374, 82 A.2d 93 (1951).
Rule 54(d) provides for the allowance of costs to the prevailing party and incorporates by reference existing statutes as to costs. See R.S.1954, Chap. 113, Sec. 155ff [now 14 M.R.S.A. § 1501]. These sections were amended in 1959 so as to conform to these rules.
Rule 54(e) covers taxation of costs. It is taken from Revised Rules of Court 29.
Rule 54(f) is based upon Revised Rules of Court 48, with minor changes necessitated by the adoption of these rules. It also includes the substance of Revised Rules of Court 13. Taxable costs for travel and attendance are as provided by statute. R.S.1954, Chap. 113, Sec. 156 [now 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502].
Rule 54(g) covers the taxing of costs in the taking of depositions. It has no counterpart in Federal Rule 54, but it reflects the case law developed in Federal practice under the rules. See 3 B & H § 1197. It is to be emphasized that the taxing of costs on depositions is subject to the discretion of the court. Costs are not to be allowed unless the court finds that the taking of the deposition was reasonably necessary. Ordinarily the cost of taking a deposition for use at trial because of the prospective unavailability of a witness will be regarded as taxable, but the rule makes it clear that the actual use of the deposition as evidence is not the exclusive test. The rules permit the very broad use of depositions for discovery purposes, and discretion as to the allowance of costs therefor is necessary in order to forestall abuse of this privilege.
Plain-English Summary
A judgment includes a decree and any order an appeal can be taken from, and it cannot recite the pleadings or the record of prior proceedings. When a case involves more than one claim or more than one party, an order resolving only some of them does not become a final, appealable judgment unless the court expressly finds no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of judgment on those claims or parties; without that finding, the order remains open to revision until every claim and every party's rights are resolved. A claim for attorney fees gets its own rule: a judgment on all other claims is final even though the fee claim remains open, unless the court expressly finds the fee claim integral to the relief sought, and an application for fees must generally be filed within 60 days of judgment (or, if an appeal is taken, within 30 days after the appeal's final disposition), decided by the same judge who ruled on the merits.
A default judgment cannot exceed, or differ in kind from, what the demand for judgment asked for, but every other judgment grants the prevailing party the relief it is entitled to even if that relief was not specifically demanded. Costs go to the prevailing party as a matter of course unless the court directs otherwise, taxed by the clerk from a bill the prevailing party submits (or, absent a bill, from the court's own inspection of the file), with notice to the adverse party if requested. The rule lists the categories of taxable fees, and separately gives the court discretion over deposition costs, allowable only if the deposition was reasonably necessary, whether or not it was used at trial.
Frequently Asked Questions
When does a partial judgment on some claims or parties become final and appealable?
Only when the court expressly finds there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of judgment on those claims or parties; without that finding, the order remains open to revision until the whole case is resolved.
How does an attorney-fee claim affect when a judgment becomes final?
A judgment on all other claims is final on its own unless the court expressly finds the fee claim is integral to the relief sought; the fee application itself must generally be filed within 60 days of judgment, or within 30 days after an appeal's final disposition.
Can a default judgment award more than what was demanded?
No, a default judgment cannot be different in kind from or exceed the amount in the demand for judgment, unlike other judgments, which can grant relief the prevailing party is entitled to even beyond what was specifically demanded.