Rule 61.Harmless Error
Not amended since adoption on record · Last verified July 13, 2026
Full Text of Rule 61
Reporter's Notes
Reporter’s Notes to Rule 61: 1. Rule 61 is identical to FRCP 61. The philosophy behind this rule is that proceedings should not be disturbed because of a technical error which resulted in no prejudice. Gutshall v. Wood, 123 F.2d 174 (C.A., 1942). While there is no corollary under prior Arkansas law, this rule does appear to express the Arkansas attitude towards harmless error.
2. The first paragraph of superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1901 (Repl. 1962) relative to new trials provided that a verdict or decision could be vacated and a new trial granted for the grounds stated therein which materially affected the substantial rights of the party. Implicit in that statute was the requirement that the error be prejudicial in order to justify the granting of a new trial. Also, Rule 103(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and of the Uniform Rules of Evidence recognizes that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. This is simply another way of saying that the error must be other than harmless to afford any basis for complaint.
3. While this rule governs practice in trial courts, the appellate courts also should follow the same test. Box v. Swindle, 306 F.2d 882 (C.C.A. 5th, 1962); Keaton v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 321 F. 2d 317 (C.C.A. 7th, 1963). Ultimately, the determination of whether an error is prejudicial rests with the appellate court. The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that harmless error affords no basis for complaint and this rule simply confirms the settled rule of law in this State.
Plain-English Summary
Rule 61 states a principle every trial lawyer eventually leans on: an error in admitting or excluding evidence, or any other misstep in a ruling or proceeding, is not by itself grounds for a new trial or for disturbing a judgment. The question the rule poses is not whether something went wrong, but whether refusing to grant relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. If the error made no difference to the outcome, the judgment stands.
The rule cuts both ways -- it applies to what the court does and to what the parties do, and it applies at every stage of a proceeding. A court is directed to disregard any error or defect that does not touch a party's substantial rights. That keeps parties from combing a trial transcript for technical missteps and using them as leverage to relitigate a case that came out correctly on the merits, and it keeps appellate review focused on errors that mattered rather than errors that merely occurred.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does it mean for an error to be "harmless" under Rule 61?
An error is harmless when it did not affect a party's substantial rights -- when the outcome would have been the same, or close enough, without it. Rule 61 tells the court to disregard errors of that kind rather than granting a new trial or setting aside the judgment over them.
Does Rule 61 only apply to evidence rulings?
No. It covers any error or defect in a ruling, order, or anything done or omitted by the court or the parties, not just decisions to admit or exclude evidence. The common thread is whether the mistake affected substantial rights, not what kind of mistake it was.
Who decides whether an error was harmless?
The trial court applies the standard first, but appellate courts apply the same test on review. The ultimate call on prejudice often lands with the appellate court, which is why raising and preserving the argument that an error was not harmless matters as much as raising the error itself.
How does Rule 61 relate to a Rule 59 motion for new trial?
Rule 59 lists the grounds on which a new trial can be granted, but Rule 61 sits behind it as a filter: even a recognized error under Rule 59, such as an evidentiary mistake or a legal error at trial, will not support a new trial unless it also affected a substantial right and made granting relief necessary for substantial justice.